active part in army reforms, but he came into conflict with the Union Liberale, which took its orders from Sherif Pasha in Paris, and he was murdered by one of its members on June 11 1913.
SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING (see 24.867). The period from 1910-21 was marked by great progress in shipbuilding; that progress was in some ways interrupted, in others stimulated, by the World War, which overshadowed every phase of develop- ment both in commercial and naval enterprise. The naval strengths during ten years after 1921 of the chief nations were restricted as a result of the decisions summarized in the article WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.
The great object of the Allied belligerents during the war being to obtain the maximum output both of war material and of merchant ships on which their supplies depended, those respon- sible for the building of all types of ships naturally turned their attention to standardization. This had the effect of retarding the adoption of new inventions on the one hand; but on the other the novel circumstances and continued development of material by Germany during the war, and the ruthless use made of that war material, continually called for novel devices and new types of ships to meet and defeat the continually changing and ever-increasing intensity of the campaign. This, whilst it produced many new types of warships and countless devices for their improvement in offence and defence, in the case of many classes of warships, but more particularly in the design of mer- chant ships, had the effect of developing standardized types, both in Great Britain and later in America, in order to increase the numbers of ships for transport purposes of all kinds and so counter the enormous losses due to the German submarine cam- paign. After the Armistice, although at first there was an enor- mous demand for ships of all classes, the slump in trade in 1920-1 and the very high prices of ships had the effect of reducing the demand. In Great Britain many of the warships building after the Armistice were broken up and no new ships had in 1921 been started. The output of merchant ships was in 1921 steadily de- clining, so that it could not be said that shipbuilding had yet re- sumed that steady advance which was being made before the war.
The outstanding features which have affected the design of all classes of ships specially are the gradual adoption of oil in lieu of coal as a fuel, the further development of the steam turbine, and, for certain classes of vessels, the progress made with internal- combustion engines (see INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES).
In the British navy, and to a great extent in other navies, during this period, oil most completely superseded coal for steam- raising. At first destroyers were the only type of vessel, apart from submarines, in which coal was altogether abolished as a fuel in the British navy. Then in 1912 light cruisers of the " Are- thusa " class had oil only. A little later in that year, in the " Queen Elizabeth " class of battleships oil was decided upon as the only fuel for the first time in a capital ship. Subsequently to that, no British warship proper, with the exception of the " Ra- leigh " class of io,ooo-ton light cruisers, which were destined for world-wide work, had anything but oil as a fuel, and in the " Raleighs " seven-eighths of the power was derived from oil. This change was a very momentous one to make, especially when it is considered that in Welsh coal Great Britain possessed the finest and then the cheapest steam coal in the world. In spite of this, however, the advantages of oil were so great that, when in use it had been found satisfactory, coal was relegated to be the fuel of none but special or auxiliary ships in the navy.
The advantages of oil may be summarized shortly as follows: For the same weight it has 50% more thermal value than coal. It occupies less space and can be stowed in spaces inconvenient for coal and other stores. Boilers with oil remain much cleaner for a long period, so that full power can be kept up indefinitely as long as the fuel lasts. Oil can be easily taken on board at any time, thus not calling upon the crew for the great exertion in- volved in coaling ship hurriedly, perhaps just before their ener- gies are required for fighting an action. The exertion of stoking is entirely done away with and far fewer men are required in the stokehold, which is always clean and comfortable. With oil also much larger boilers can be used, which saves space in the boiler-
rooms. Though there are other contingent advantages, those named are enough to show that the British Admiralty took a wise course in adopting oil for all fighting ships, and this was amply proved during the war.
Subsequently, owing to the very high price of coal and of wages for firemen, many of the advantages enumerated above induced merchant shipowners to adopt oil in place of coal for high-powered passenger vessels. In low-speed cargo-boats the great economy of internal-combustion engines as compared with steam-engines, makes the advantage of the adoption of oil still more paramount, and the number of these vessels has been largely increased. The comparatively low powers, however, which can be got with internal-combustion engines prevented their being adopted up to 1921 for fast merchant ships or for any warships, except submarines, which generally have compara- tively low power and moderate speed. In submarines a much lighter internal-combustion engine than that used for cargo vessels has been developed, with a high number of revolutions.
Another very important advance in marine engines has been gained by the used of toothed gearing. This gear enabling the high number of revolutions in turbines to be reduced, so that large slow-running propellers can be used in conjunction with very quick-running efficient turbines, a much higher efficiency has been secured and increased speed of ship and economy of working has resulted. In its present form this gearing was first introduced in 1910 by Sir Charles Parsons in connexion with the turbine engines of a merchant vessel named the " Vespasian." The success of the trials of this ship led to the further adoption of gearing, and for the British navy it was first tried in destroyers, then in some light cruisers, and was in 1921 gradually coming into use for most war ships and many mercantile ships. The largest ship in which it had been adopted was H.M.S. " Hood."
I. BRITISH WARSHIPS
Taking the first most important type of British warship, namely capital ships, the naval actions in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 had demonstrated the capital importance of the heavy long-range gun, while the turbine system of propulsion had been sufficiently tested in high-speed passenger vessels and small warships to justify its adoption, at any rate experimentally, in warships of a larger size. These changes were, no doubt, bold ones, both as regards guns and machinery; but the wisdom of their selection for the design of the first " Dreadnought," in 1905, was sufficiently vindicated by subsequent experience, and by the general acceptance of these two features by other naval Powers.
Laid down in Oct. 1905, the original " Dreadnought " proved so successful that from 1907 onwards the designs of British capi- tal ships moved on progressive lines without departing from the essential principle of the " Dreadnought " type, viz. a ship carrying an all-big-gun armament, adequately protected for taking her place in the line of battle, and of a speed at least equal to that of any foreign ship of similar rank.
The next 10 years therefore saw a succession of post- " Dread- nought " battleships in which the primary armament passed from the ten iz-in. guns of the " Dreadnought " through the ten 13-5- in. guns of the " Orion " (all on the centre line of the ship) to the eight is-in. guns of the " Queen Elizabeth," an increase, within that brief period, of over 126% in the heavy projectile weight of discharge. There was no secondary battery, properly speak- ing. The " Dreadnought " carried 24 i2-pdrs. for repelling T.B.D. attack, but this armament was soon recognized as being too light for the ever-increasing size and power of destroyers, and in subsequent ships up to the " King George V." class (inclusive) batteries of 12 to 16 4-in. guns were mounted as high up as possible to repel the attack of destroyers. In the " Iron Duke " and " Queen Elizabeth " classes 6-in. Q.F. guns were substituted for the 4-in., as the latter weapon was then thought to be insufficient against destroyers and light cruisers.
The speed of these battleships was kept at the uniform level of 21 knots up to and including the " Iron Duke " class. The type of turbine machinery on four shafts, which had proved so satis- factory in the original " Dreadnought," became the standard,
