The Cunard and White Star companies were in a favourable
position as regards the great trans-Atlantic liners, “Aquitania,” of
45,600 tons, and “Olympic,” of 46,300 tons, since these vessels had
been adapted to the use of oil fuel in 1920. Oil fuel, after the war,
increased in popularity, although some owners hesitated to commit
themselves too much to it, owing to fears that supplies would not be
sufficiently abundant, and planned their vessels with a view to the
use of either oil or coal. Scandinavian owners, especially, pinned their
faith to motor-engines, and it was notable that while coal-burning
steamers were laid up idle, motor vessels belonging to the same
ownerships were being profitably employed. There was good reason
to believe that an extensive development of the use of motor-engines
was to be expected. It was quite certain in 1921 that a strenuous
competitive period lay ahead for shipping, and owners had to take
into account all possible measures conducive to cheap transport at
sea.
- (C. Ma.)
(2) United States
From the founding of the Federal Government in 1789 onward the United States has possessed a considerable merchant marine. For a hundred years it was the second power in amount of merchant tonnage in the world, surpassed only by the United Kingdom. From the end of the Civil War in 1865 to the outbreak of the World War in 1914, though the American flag was infrequently seen in foreign waters, a great and valuable merchant shipping was in existence, with well-equipped shipyards and a large force of officers and seamen, chiefly employed in home trade on the Great Lakes or on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific seaboards with their insular dependencies. The American people at no time in their history have been out of intimate touch with shipbuilding and navigation.
Unlike other nations the United States has steadily maintained an important and increasing waterborne domestic commerce capable of holding its own with formidable railway competition. This coastwise commerce, including the trade with Alaska, Porto Rico and Hawaii, by an unshaken national policy, has been reserved entirely to American vessels, and has had a significant bearing on the development of the American merchant marine. It is interesting to recall that in 1860, the year before the opening of the Civil War, the commercial fleet of the United States was divided almost equally between 2,379,396 gross tons registered for foreign commerce and 2,644,867 tons enrolled or licensed for coastwise carrying. In 1866, the year after the close of the Civil War, the registered foreign trade fleet, as a result of the war, had fallen off to 1,387,756 gross tons—a decrease of almost a million tons—while the coastwise fleet had increased to 3,381,522 tons. This tendency of the foreign trade shipping to decrease, and of the domestic trade fleet to grow, was even more manifest by the year 1910, when the former had fallen to 782,517 gross tons, or actually less than the 981,019 tons which the United States had possessed a century earlier in 1810, while the coastal fleet had increased to 6,668,966 tons, or more than twice as much as the entire American commercial shipping of 1860.
This sharp contrast between the steady decline of the overseas tonnage and the unbroken advance of the domestic tonnage is attributable to the intensity of foreign competition in the one trade and to the absence of it in the other. Through those years the wages of American crews and their subsistence and general style of living imposed a higher cost upon the operation of American ships, and American-built ships in addition bore a substantially higher cost of construction. Moreover, American laws and regulations governing ships have contributed somewhat to this higher expense by their more exacting character. Against this higher expense the coastwise vessels from 1860 onward were absolutely protected by the exclusion of foreign vessels from domestic trade, while the overseas vessels were protected in no way whatever, except for casual postal subsidies to a few regular lines. In view of the fact that from 1860 high protection has been almost continuous in the United States, this exception of the most intensely competitive of industries, ocean shipping, is difficult to understand. The generally accepted explanation is that it has not been possible at any time to present a definite form of national encouragement to the overseas shipping industry which was acceptable to all of the various sections of the country. Subsidies have almost been voted by Congress several times. Discriminating customs duties and tonnage dues, an expedient first adopted in 1789 and maintained in whole or in part for 60 years thereafter, have had a powerful advocacy but, as a matter of fact, have never been made effective because of general commercial treaties which have forbidden them. “Free ships”—that is, the free admission and registry of foreign-built vessels instead of the general prohibition of American registry for foreign-built vessels obtaining since 1789—were adopted for vessels of less than five years of age in the Panama Canal Act of 1912, but had remained wholly futile up to the war of 1914, which suddenly gave exceptional value to the nag of the greatest neutral.
Pre-war Position.—American overseas shipping as distinguished from coastwise shipping reached almost the lowest ebb in 1910, when only 782,517 gross tons were recorded by the Commissioner of Navigation as registered for foreign commerce and sufficed to convey only 8.7% of the total imports and exports of the United States. Though relatively little effort had been bestowed upon the promotion of foreign commerce in these years of wonderful domestic development, the total foreign trade of the United States had increased markedly from a value of $762,288,550 in 1860 to $2,982,799,622 in 1910. Whatever the cause of the decline of the overseas American merchant marine, it had certainly not been from any lack of cargoes.
No change or event of consequence marked the years from 1910 to 1914 in the annals of American shipbuilding or navigation. Official records show the amount of shipbuilding, the total registered overseas and the total coastwise tonnage, the total merchant marine and the proportion of American overseas commerce conveyed in American ships, for the five fiscal years ending June 30 1914, to have been as follows:—
| Year | Ships Built |
Registered for Foreign Trade |
Enrolled or Licensed for Coastwise Trade |
Total Merchant Marine |
Proportion of Value of Imports & Exports Carried in American Ships |
| Gross tons |
Gross tons |
Gross tons |
Gross tons |
Per cent | |
| 1910 | 342,068 | 782,517 | 6,668,966 | 7,508,082 | 8.7 |
| 1911 | 291,162 | 863,495 | 6,720,313 | 7,638,790 | 8.7 |
| 1912 | 232,669 | 923,225 | 6,737,046 | 7,714,183 | 9.4 |
| 1913 | 346,155 | 1,019,165 | 6,816,980 | 7,886,518 | 8.9 |
| 1914 | 316,250 | 1,066,288 | 5,818,363 | 7,928,688 | 8.6 |
These records indicate a condition of virtual stagnation in the American merchant marine during the period immediately before the World War. New construction was only slightly in excess year after year of tonnage lost or worn out and abandoned. It was a time of disheartenment among those who desired to see an adequate ocean service under the American flag, and a valuable naval reserve for an emergency.
In the Panama Canal Act of Aug. 24 1912 Section 5 provided that “No tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States.” It was contended before and after the passage of this Act that it contravened the provision of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, that “The canal shall be free and open . . . to the vessels of commerce and war of all nations . . . on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect to the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise.” President Wilson, who had originally favoured this exemption of American coastwise ships, and had been elected on a platform approving it, unexpectedly early in 1914 advocated the repeal of the exemption provision on the ground that it was in conflict with the treaty, and also that “repeal be granted by Congress in support of the foreign policy of the Administration.” After an animated debate in the course of which the President was opposed by several senators of his own party, and at the same time upheld by some eminent Republicans, including Senator Root of New York, repeal was finally accomplished. No actual advantage had accrued to American coastwise vessels from the toll exemption, for the canal had not then been opened to commerce. It was opened Aug. 15 1914, and was utilized in its first year by 1,317 vessels, including merchant carriers, men-of-war and yachts, of an aggregate net Panama Canal tonnage of 4,596,644. Tolls paid amounted to $5,216,149. In the coast-to-coast fleet of the United States there was soon a notable expansion, and new and important steamers of 10,000 or 12,000 tons dead-weight capacity were plying on the route shortened from 13,000 m. via the Straits of Magellan to 6,000 m. via the Canal. These large coastwise steamers were destined to prove of abundant value to American overseas commerce in the emergency presented by the war.
War Period.—When the World War began in Europe Aug. 1 1914 all but 8.6% of the imports and exports of the United States were being conveyed in foreign vessels, chiefly of British and German nationality. The first result was the voluntary “interning” in American harbours of a considerable fleet of
