Opposite the French, where they do not appear to have been
expecting an attack, they were proportionately weaker, having
three divisions in the line on a front of eleven miles.
Relatively to the numbers engaged in the Loos offensive the British army was not employing in its first attack any greatly increased force of infantry. Where its preparations had altogether outstripped those of Sept. 1915 was in artillery, and it was on this arm that its chief hopes rested. For the six days' preliminary bombardment the heavy guns available were so numerous that it was difficult to find good positions for them all. Indeed the artillery personnel engaged in the first attack came to nearly half that of the infantry, and in weight as well as in number of guns the Allied artillery were able to establish a pre- dominance over the enemy. This was largely due to the success with which the Royal Flying Corps was at the time contending against the enemy's aircraft; the mastery of the air which it had established ensured to the Allies when weather conditions per- mitted observation of artillery fire and denied to the enemy this important advantage and the opportunity of gaining in- formation of movements behind the lines. Ammunition, too, if not as unlimited as it was to be in 1918, was plentiful. The careful economy which had been a painful necessity during the winter and spring had allowed the accumulation of large reserves, and although the great development of munition-making in England, undertaken in the summer of 1915, was only just begin- ning to produce its effects, its influence was already apparent in the effective bombardment to which the German positions were subjected for the week preceding the attack.
In one way the bombardment was almost too effective. The destruction was in some places so complete that it proved far more difficult to consolidate captured positions and to hold them against counter-attacks than to carry them. But to a large extent the German defences proved capable of withstanding even the tremendous shelling to which they had been subjected. Many nests of machine-guns had escaped intact, in places there wei still stretches of uncut wire and the German artillery were able to make a most effective reply. North of the Ancre in particular German counter-battery work had much to do with the failure of the 3ist Div. (VIII. Corps), the left of the main attack, to capture Serre. On its right the 4th Div. penetrated some way into the German position N. of Beaumont-Hamel, but found its flanks exposed by the check to the jist Div. and by the failure of the 2gth Div. against Beaumont-Hamel itself, one of the very strongest parts of the German line. It was counter- attacked and driven out after a stubborn resistance.
Immediately S. of the Ancre the X. Corps fared little better than the VIII. Its left division, the 36th (Ulster) began well and pressed forward N. of Thiepval. But Thi6pval itself, another formidable fortress, defied the attacks of the 40 th and 3 2nd Divs., with the result that the very success of the 36th contributed to its undoing. Its advanced detachments were cut off and over- whelmed, and in the end it was forced to evacuate its captures. South of Thiepval, however, at the angle known as the Leipzig Salient a slender foothold was gained and maintained despite the vigour of the German counter-attacks. On the right of the X. Corps, the 8th and 34th Divs. of the III. Corps had two very difficult places to attack in the strongly fortified villages of Ovillers and La Boisselle. Neither of these was captured, but the III. Corps managed to penetrate the German lines on either side of them, very slightly N. of Ovillers, rather more deeply between that and La Boisselle, and very much deeper S. of La Boisselle. Here also the 2ist Div. of the XV. Corps, flanked on its right by a brigade of the iyth Div., made substantial progress N. of Fricourt, which village was in danger of being cut off, as E. of it the yth Div., also of the XV. Corps, was most successful, storming the German front lines and penetrating as far as the village of Mametz. To the right again the XIII. Corps (i8th and 3oth Divs.) made great progress, reaching all its objectives from Montauban, W. to Mametz and E. to the Briqueterie. Thus, despite the failure of the British left and the limited suc- cess of the centre, the right had made a promising opening. The reverse on the left may be in part explained by the excep-
tional strength of the German defences N. of the Ancre, and by the concentration of the German artillery in that quarter where they both expected and especially feared an attack. Had Beaumont-Hamel and Thiepval gone the German position on the main ridge would have been more seriously endangered than it was by the British success between Fricourt and Montauban. But if the Germans were less well prepared for an attack on this frontage, opposite the French they were certainly neither expect- ing one nor ready for it; and this, together with the ample ar- tillery support available and the superior experience of the French gunners, contributed to the complete success of General Foch's attack. On both banks of the Somme his infantry mas- tered the German front system and made their way deep into their positions, reaching the outskirts of Hardecourt and Curlu N. of the river, while S. of it they progressed even farther, taking Dompierre and Foy. Exploiting their victory, the French pressed on, and by July 4 not only penetrated into the second system of German defences, but captured it over a length of six miles from Estrees N. to the Somme at Buscourt. Some 6,000 prisoners fell into their hands, with many guns, and as S. of the river they were well forward of the line reached on the right bank they were able to enfilade the German positions from across the river. While General Foch's troops were exploiting and increasing their gains the British IV. Army was similarly employed, though on a frontage shorter than that originally attacked. Recognizing the futility of renewing the attempt on the formidable positions astride the Ancre, Sir Douglas Haig decided to concentrate his efforts on pushing home the success of his right. Divisions which had lost particularly heavily, like the 8th and 36th, were with- drawn and replaced by others from the reserves. Four days of hard and Continuous fighting substantially extended the lodg- ment gained on July i. The yth and iyth Divs. joined hands behind Fricourt, cutting off that village; then, supported by the 23rd, they pressed forward against Contalmaison while the igth Div. on their left reduced La Boisselle and made headway towards Ovillers. Advancing from Montauban after repulsing several strong counter-attacks the XIII. Corps captured Cater- pillar and Bernafay Woods. With this the hostile front system over a front of six miles was secured and consolidated, but before a footing could be gained on the main ridge it was necessary to cross the valley which runs N.E. from Fricourt, to gain more ground towards Contalmaison, and to reduce Ovillers.
On July 7 therefore a second stage of the first battle started, the 1 2th and 25th Divs. assailing Ovillers while the troops who had cleared Fricourt and La Boisselle pushed on against Con- talmaison and the 38th (Welsh) Div. attacked Mametz Wood. This last proved difficult to reduce but was finally cleared by the zist Division. By July 13 Contalmaison also had been taken, and after some desperate fighting by the gth, i8th, and 3oth Divs. important gains had been made on the British right, Trones Wood (which changed hands repeatedly) being the scene of the fiercest contests. Meanwhile the French had cleared Hardecourt and advanced their line S. of the Somme to Biaches.
During all this fighting the German resistance had been stiffen- ing. The stubborn fights which had been put up for Ovillers and Contalmaison and Trones Wood had given time for the arrival of strong reinforcements and the reorganization of the defence. The divisions on whom had fallen the brunt of the bombardment and of the first attack had been relieved by fresher troops; artillery had been shifted to meet the requirements of the new situation. Moreover, as the Allies advanced over the area devastated by the bombardment their administrative difficulties increased at each step; the advance of the guns to new positions meant new arrangements for ammunition supply, roads had to be repaired or improvised, and the feeding and watering of the advanced troops were laborious and troublesome. All these circumstances added to the difficulties of the next step, the assault upon the enemy's second system of defences on the S. crest of the main ridge. This system, though hardly as strong as that stormed on July i, was formidable enough, and, like it, was supported by the
- ortified villages Longueval, Bazentin le Grand, and Bazentin
.e Petit and by several woods. To get within assaulting distance
