stormed by the nth Division. Meanwhile the progress of the Australians beyond and W. of Pozieres had greatly increased the prospects of success in attacking Thiepval.
From Thiepval a trench ran E. towards Courcelette known as the Zollern trench, halfway along which and N. of Mouquet Farm was the Zollern redoubt. North of Thiepval was the strongly fortified Schwaben redoubt from which the Stuff trench ran E. to the Stuff redoubt S. of Grandcourt, being continued beyond the Stuff redoubt as Regina trench. The capture of this second line would allow the British to overlook the Ancre valley and would make the position of the Germans N. of the Ancre most precarious. It was natural, therefore, that the Germans should cling with great pertinacity to the Thiepval position, but despite a stubborn resistance the V. Army's attack (Sept. 26) achieved a conspicuous success. The Canadian Corps on the right carried their objectives and brought their line within striking distance of Regina trench. The nth Div. stormed the Zollern redoubt, the i8th on the left had the satisfaction of capturing Thiepval itself with over 1,000 prisoners from a Wiirt- temberg regiment, which had held that stronghold for nearly two years and believed it impregnable. These successes were promptly exploited and the capture of the Stuff redoubt by the nth Div. and of part of the Schwaben redoubt by the i8th (Sept. 27-28) left the Germans with only a scanty foothold on the main ridge.
Simultaneously with the success at Thiepval, lesser but useful gains had been made by the IV. Army, including the capture of Destremont Farm, S. of Le Sars (Sept. 29). This was followed up by the taking after a stubborn fight of Eaucourt 1'Abbaye (Oct. 3), though a gallant effort by the Canadians against Regina trench (Oct. i) proved unsuccessful.
Fourth Phase. It was at this moment, when the enemy's fourth system of defences had been reached and the Allies seemed about to accomplish a break-through (for the new lines on which he was at work still farther to the rear were not to be compared in strength or completeness with those already overcome), that a long spell of bad weather set in. Nothing could have been more unlucky for the Allies. As has been said, the German infantry were no longer righting with their old resolution, their counter-attacks were not pressed with the old devotion and determination. But the constant rain and the cloudy days, which formed almost the only intervals in the rain, prevented adequate observation of artillery fire and turned the already damaged battle area into an impassable quagmire. The troops already engaged in the Somme offensive had had ample experience of hardships and difficulties; those encountered in Oct. and Nov. altogether surpassed what had gone before. The state of the ground was appalling: it had become a sea of mud, through which even lightly equipped runners found movement almost impossible, much more men laden with rifle, equipment and ammunition. In these conditions an ordinary trench relief was an achievement, to attack across such ground a hopeless undertaking. It is easy now to argue that the attempt to continue the attack in such adverse circumstances was a mistake, and could achieve nothing commensurate with the casualties and sufferings which it en- tailed. But it must not be forgotten that to suspend the offensive meant relaxing the pressure on the Germans, on whom the strain of fighting under these conditions was scarcely less severe and meant also giving them time to convert their incomplete new lines into defences scarcely less formidable than those the Allies had so painfully slowly pierced. At the beginning of Oct. the Germans had been pressed back to their last really strong positions, and behind the line that ran from Sailly-Saillisel past Le Transloy and in front of Bapaume they had not had time to develop anything elaborate or formidable. The anxiety of the higher command to pierce the Le Transloy line without delay was natural enough.
The situation after the capture of Thiepval was that on the British left the Germans retained a precarious footing on the heights above St. Pierre Divion and Grandcourt, but that any substantial advance by the British centre, now almost down into the Ancre valley N. of Martinpuich and Guedecourt, would
turn the German positions lower down the Ancre. As before, however, the centre could not push on far with safety unless the right came forward level with it, and it was in front of the right that the German positions were most formidable. Their Sailly- Saillisel-Le Transloy line, itself strong, was covered by a long spur running in a N.W. direction and separating Lesboeufs and Guedecourt from Le Transloy and Beaulencourt. To capture this spur was indispensable before the Le Transloy line could be attacked. But a successful attack on the Le Transloy line was needed to open to the Allies the opportunity for an advance on a wide front in a N. and N. E. direction. Such a stroke would not merely outflank the Beaumont-Hamel position but the whole German position from Arras to the Ancre would be taken in rear. A dry Oct. might well have seen this hope realized and in Oct. 1916 there was no " Hindenburg Line " to bring an Allied advance to a standstill.
But with the weather as it was Oct. was a month of disap- pointment and scanty progress. The fighting was constant and costly. Trenches were difficult to take but much more difficult to consolidate or defend. The operations may be divided into three groups; on the right the French attacked and took Sailly- Saillisel but could make little progress N. and E. of it. In this quarter the repeated British efforts against the spur in front of Le Transloy resulted in the establishment of their line on its crest of the spur. In the centre, after the capture of Eaucourt L'Abbaye (Oct. 3) the chief gain was that the 23rd Div. secured Le Sars on Oct. 7. But to the N.E. of Le Sars the Allied prog- ress was arrested by the gentle rise on which stands the mound known as the Butte de Warlencourt. This position was not particularly formidable in itself and in dry weather would not have held up the advance for long, but between the difficulty of accurately observing the fire of the supporting artillery and that of moving up the muddy slope on which the Butte stood attack after attack failed. The 47th Div. on Oct. 7, the pth and i3th on Oct. 12, the $oth on Oct. 25 all found the Butte impregnable, though between Oct. 18 and 20 the gth Div. did secure an ad- vanced position in Snag trench, halfway up the slope, after a savage struggle.
The failure to take the Butte de Warlencourt or to make any substantial progress farther to the E. was to some degree com- pensated for on the left. Despite more than one repulse the line of Regina trench from the Courcelette-Pys road W. was stormed on Oct. 21 by the isth, i8th, 39th and 4th Canadian Divs., and on Nov. 10 the Canadians extended their success by capturing the E. part of the trench on a front of half a mile.
By this time a sufficient improvement had taken place in the weather to allow of an operation on a larger scale than anything attempted since the battles of Morval and Thiepval. The more ambitious schemes for an advance across the Upper Ancre could not be put into force, but the German hold on the Beaumont- Hamel position had been weakened by the capture of Thi6pval and it was decided to renew the attack in this quarter, the only portion of the frontage originally attacked which was still in German hands.
After a bombardment covering two days, the attack was delivered about an hour before daybreak on Nov. 13. South of the Ancre the igth Div. cleared the German trenches N. of the Schwaben and Stuff redoubts and the 39th Div. took its farthest objective at St. Pierre Divion with remarkable ease and rapidity. North of the river the 63rd (Royal Naval) Div. fought its way forward to Beaucourt sur Ancre and held on tenaciously though in advance of the troops on its left. These, the sist (Highland) Div., had been stoutly opposed at Beaumont- Hamel but had finally mastered the village, N. of which the 2nd Div. had carried the right portion of its objective. On the left, however, where the ground was specially heavy, the 3rd and 3ist Divs. had been less successful; Serre had once again proved impregnable. But on the following day the success was exploited, Beaucourt was captured and the sist and and Divs. pushing forward along the spur N. and E. of Beaumont-Hamel established themselves on a line which secured Beaucourt on the N. and W. With this important gain of ground over 7,000
