Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
Endnotes: Chapter 4
- ↑ See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 7 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Noah Feldman, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Feldman Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Feldman-Presidential-Commission-6-25-21.pdf; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 8, 12–13 (Oct. 2021) (written testimony of Philip Bobbitt, Columbia Law School) [hereinafter Bobbitt Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Professor-Philip-Bobbitt.pdf; Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Answering the Lochner Objection: Reexamining Substantive Due Process and the Role of Courts in a Democracy, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1902 (2001) (manuscript at 28–39), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3869128.
- ↑ Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 7 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Samuel Moyn, Yale Law School) [hereinafter Moyn Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Moyn-Testimony.pdf; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 3–5 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Nikolas Bowie, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Bowie Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony-1.pdf; see also Ryan Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 Calif. L. Rev. 1703 (2021); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893); Robert H. Bork, The End of Democracy? Our Judicial Oligarchy, First Things (Nov. 1996), https://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/11/the-end-of-democracy-our-judicial-oligarchy.
- ↑ See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16 (1962) (introducing the term “the counter-majoritarian difficulty”). For academic critiques of judicial supremacy, see, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 249–53 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 177 (1999); and Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 789 (2002). For a defense, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1362 (1997).
- ↑ See Bowie Testimony, supra note 2, at 15–16, 19, 23 (describing how Justices share the same elite educational backgrounds).
- ↑ Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2 (June 25, 2021) (written testimony of Rosalind Dixon, University of New South Wales) [hereinafter Dixon Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Dixon-Letter-SC-commission-June-25-final.pdf; see also Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 21 (2009).
- ↑ See generally Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 Yale L.J. 886, 888 (2008) (reviewing Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (2007)).
- ↑ See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
- ↑ Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
- ↑ See infra notes 139–141.
- ↑ Dixon Testimony, supra note 5, at 7; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 3 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University) [hereinafter Scheppele Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Scheppele-Written-Testimony.pdf.
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