what heavy witted and lacked the foresight desirable in one who had to conduct strategical operations. When, on January 14, the Portuguese fleet from Goa appeared off the port instead of adopting Best's plan of going out to engage it where he would have plenty of sea room and consequently scope for the exercise of his peculiar skill he remained at anchor at Swally in the confined roadstead which Sir Thomas Roe afterwards contemptuously but not inaptly described as "a fishpond." The blunder might have been fatal if to his temperamental shortcomings Downton had added a lack of courage. But he was as brave as a lion and as tenacious as a bulldog, and the balance was, as will be seen, redressed by these splendid qualities.
The Portuguese had made the most elaborate preparations for the fight. They were determined, if possible, to deliver a crushing blow which would not only settle the immediate difficulty but serve as a definite and final notice to their English rivals to quit the shores of India. The force they got together for this purpose consisted of six large galleons, two smaller ships and sixty small ships called frigates, with, in addition, two galleys and sundry insignificant craft. On the galleons were the flower of the Portuguese nobility, all imbued with a keen hatred of the hereticos and a fixed determination to destroy them or die in the attempt. The whole were under the command of Don Jeronimo, one of the most distinguished of the Portuguese functionaries in the East at the time. A day or two passed after the appearance of the Portuguese fleet without anything of importance happening. "In order to give an edge to their courage," as a letter written at the period puts it, Downton caused the Merchant's
