been made untenable by the land battery which the unfortunate Baffin had so skilfully directed. Tendering his submission, this time unconditionally, he was escorted with his brother officers to one of the English ships, much to the disappointment of the Persians, who had hoped that they might have secured possession of the person of the eminent captive and so have been able to grace their triumph in a manner which would have appealed to the native imagination.
As soon as the joint occupation of Kishm had been arranged, the English fleet sailed across to Gombroon to prepare for the larger task of attacking Ormuz. There was a splendid audacity about the contemplated operation which would have appealed to a Nelson or a Howe. The city was defended by a strong fort occupying a position at the end of a narrow spit of land, the approach to which was completely covered by the Portuguese guns. Apart from the land defences there had to be reckoned with the Portuguese fleet, which was in every way superior to the English force. The Persian alliance, no doubt, was a counterbalancing advantage, but the experience of Shah Abbas's troops gained at Kishm had not been of a character to justify undue reliance on their prowess. Moreover, the conditions were such that the principal fighting would necessarily have to be done on the seafront of the city.
The English commanders appear to have been from the first fully confident of their ability to carry the attack to a successful issue, for they deliberately weakened their force by despatching one of their ships, the Lion, to Surat with Ruy Freire and his fellow-captives. They doubtless reckoned on the moral effect of their victory at Kishm and on the confusion which would necessarily be caused by the
