Page:Early Greek philosophy by John Burnet, 3rd edition, 1920.djvu/221

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207
EMPEDOKLES OF AKRAGAS

(11, 12)

Fools!—for they have no far-reaching thoughts—who deem that what before was not comes into being, or that aught can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that aught can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; 5for it will always be, wherever one may keep putting it. R. P. 165 a.

(13)

And in the All there is naught empty and naught too full.

(14)

In the All there is naught empty. Whence, then, could aught come to increase it?

(15)

A man who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart that as long as mortals live what they call their life, so long they are, and suffer good and ill; while before they were formed and after they have been dissolved they are just nothing at all. R. P. 165 a.

(16)

For even as they (Strife and Love) were aforetime, so too they shall be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair. R. P. 166 c.

(17)

I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only out of many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; 5the other grows up and is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at another each borne in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, 10and to become many once more when the one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never cease changing