Page:Early Greek philosophy by John Burnet, 3rd edition, 1920.djvu/263

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EMPEDOKLES OF AKRAGAS
249

fitting into the pores and perceived."[1] It is not quite clear how these two accounts of vision were reconciled, or how far we are entitled to credit Empedokles with the theory of Plato's Timaeus. The statements quoted seem to imply something very like it.[2]

Theophrastos tells us that Empedokles made no distinction between thought and perception, a remark already made by Aristotle.[3] The chief seat of perception was the blood, in which the four elements are most evenly mixed, and especially the blood near the heart (fr. 105).[4] This does not, however, exclude the idea that other parts of the body may perceive also; indeed, Empedokles held that all things have their share of thought (fr. 103). But the blood was specially sensitive because of its finer mixture.[5] From this it naturally follows that Empedokles adopted the view, already maintained in the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides (fr. 16), that our knowledge varies with the varying constitution of our bodies (fr. 106).

119.Theology and religion. The theoretical theology of Empedokles reminds us of Xenophanes, his practical religious teaching of Pythagoras and the Orphics. We are told in the earlier part of the poem that certain "gods" are composed of the elements; and that therefore though they "live long lives" they must pass away (fr. 21). The elements and the Sphere are also called gods, but that is in quite another sense of the word, and the elements do not pass away.

If, we turn to the religious teaching of the Purifications,

  1. The definition is quoted from Gorgias in Plato, Men. 76 d 4. All our MSS. have ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, but Ven. T has in the margin γρ. χρημάτων, which may well be an old tradition. The Ionic for "things" is χρήματα. See Diels, Empedokles und Gorgias, p. 439.
  2. See Beare, Elementary Cognition, p. 18.
  3. Arist. De an. Γ, 3. 427 a 21.
  4. R. P. 178 a. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school, from whom it passed to Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato and Hippokrates, on the other hand, adopted the view of Alkmaion (§ 97) that the brain was the seat of consciousness. At a later date, Philistion of Syracuse, Plato's friend, substituted the ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα ("animal spirits") which circulated along with the blood.
  5. Beare, p. 253.