Page:Echeverry v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC (20-30038) Opinion.pdf/4

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Space All., LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 486–87 (5th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence—more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance—that would cause a reasonable person to accept the fact finding.” Coastal Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 555 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dir., OWCP v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 125 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Echeverry presented three theories of negligence to the jury. When, as here, it is unclear from the verdict which theory of negligence persuaded the jury, a new trial is necessary if the evidence is insufficient on at least one theory even if not on all. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 2006). This court employs a harmless-error “gloss,” meaning that if we are “totally satisfied” or “reasonably certain” based on the focus of the evidence at trial that the jury’s verdict was not based on the theory with insufficient evidence, a new trial is unnecessary. Id. at 564–65. If the evidence is insufficient as to each theory, then the defendant is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. King v. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1979).

Under Louisiana law, a principal is generally not liable for the acts of its independent contractor. Graham v. Amoco Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643, 645 (5th Cir. 1994). A principal may, however, be liable if it was independently negligent in its own actions, id., or if it negligently hired the independent contractor, Hemphill v. State Farm Insurance Co., 472 So. 2d 320, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, exceptions to a principal’s shield from liability exist if the principal “retains operational control over the contractor’s acts or expressly or impliedly authorizes those acts.” Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1997).

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