asked for and received advice looking toward improvement in the conduct of the government. He foresaw the serious consequences of the Taiping Rebellion, and in 1851 sent against the rebels in Kwangsi, Sai-shang-a (see under Ch'ung-ch'i) who had been a Grand Councilor since 1841 and was one of the most capable Manchus of the period. When Sai-shang-a proved unsuccessful, I-chu removed him and put into his place Chinese of lower rank, like Hsiang Jung [q. v.]. Realizing that the Bannermen were no longer the warriors they had once been, he entrusted to Chinese officials the task of recruiting volunteer corps, and thus finally succeeded in winning back much of the conquered territory and putting the rebels on the defensive. But he did not live to see the final victory. Throughout his life he received, for the most part, only discouraging news of defeats in the field and of an exhausted treasury. As early as 1853 he forced a number of officials to surrender part of their ill-gotten wealth in order to pay the salaries of those who remained at the capital. Finally the strain became so great that he spent more and more time in the Yüan-ming Yüan (see under Hung-li) in various diversions. Though he did not entirely neglect national affairs he depended more and more upon his officials to make decisions in matters of national import.
In this weakened condition, China found herself once more at war with the English. Though five ports, including Canton, were open to foreign trade (see under Ch'i-ying), Westerners were still debarred from entering the walled city of Canton. In 1849 Hsü Kuang-chin [q. v.] was highly rewarded for refusing the request of the English to enter the city. The English government protested Hsü's decision and in May 1850 one copy of the protest, addressed to Ch'i-ying and Mu-chang-a [q. v.], was handed to the governor-general at Nanking, Lu Chien-ying 陸建瀛 (T. 仲白, H. 立夫, d. 1853), while another was dispatched (in June) to Tientsin. Two letters were also addressed by the British to Ch'i-ying. All such efforts proved fruitless, for I-chu refused to consider the requests. He was hostile to foreigners, yet had he himself wished to compromise he could not have done so without antagonizing most of the officials at Court. The English prosest of 1850 seems to have resulted in the discharge of Mu-chang-a and the degradation of Ch'i-ying. Though I-chu did not mention the protest in his edict denouncing the two statesmen who brought about the peace of 1842, yet the fact that those documents had been addressed to them probably seemed to him sufficient proof that they were culpable. Moreover, Ch'i-ying had warned the emperor that British arms were formidable and that yielding was necessary when, as a matter of fact, the English did not immediately press their claims—thus proving to I-chu that both officials had grossly miscalculated the enemy's strength.
In 1854, however, the English demanded a revision of the Treaty of 1842, and the American and French envoys wished to negotiate on the same lines. As Yeh Ming-ch'ên [q. v.] declined to negotiate at Canton with the ministers of the three powers, the three foreign envoys presented their demands to Chi-êr-hang-a [q. v.] at Shanghai. The latter forwarded their requests to Peking, but the ministers—impatient for a satisfactory reply—sailed north to Taku and started negotiation with the salt controller, Ch'ung-lun 崇編 (T. 沛如, surname Hsü 許, posthumous name 勤恪, 1792–1875). The British demands included the right to place a resident minister at Peking, to travel in the interior, to open Tientsin to foreign trade, and to lift the ban on opium. The emperor told Ch'ung-lun to refuse all these major demands and to grant conditionally only a few minor ones. Deeming the situation hopeless, the envoys returned to Hong Kong to await instructions from their respective governments. Finally the "Arrow" case afforded a pretext to start the war of 1857–58 which resulted in the occupation of Canton by the English and French troops (see under Yeh Ming-ch'ên) and also in the treaties of Tientsin (1858) with the four powers, England, France, the United States, and Russia (see under Kuei-liang). I-chu was misled, however, by the victory of Sêng-ko-lin-ch'in [q. v.] in 1859 at Taku when the British and French fleets were forced to withdraw with heavy losses. Hence, when the allies returned in 1860 and advanced on Peking, he would not believe that they could actually reach the capital, and even talked of personally taking charge of his forces at the front. In the end, however, he fled to Jehol and left the settlement of the disastrous war to I-hsin.
From this time on I-chu completely lost heart in national affairs and entrusted them to a few favorites, of whom the chief was the able Su-shun [q. v.]. Ashamed of his flight, the emperor would not return to the capital even after the allies had evacuated the city. He could not find the courage to face the officials and the people or, most humiliating of all, the foreign envoys who would press for an audience—this being one of
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