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though the means of mischief are the same. Nor is a man liable who lends his carriage to a friend, however unskilful, who drives over and damages a third person. Then it is said the master is liable under the second head of exception I have mentioned, viz., qui facit per alium facit per se. But that is not true. Because the negligence, the wrongful act, may be contrary to the master's express orders. I tell my servant never to drive in at a gate with "out" on it. He does and causes damage; I am liable. He drives without a lamp, contrary to my orders; I am liable if damage ensues. Another reason ironically given, but which has great practical effect is, that the master is liable because he is a competent paymaster, while the servant usually is not. There is another reason which exists in fact; whether good or bad, is another matter. A man is walking on the Queen's highway and run over by my servant. He may say, with some colour of fairness, "I was doing what I had a right to do. I was injured by your servant. I had no voice in the choice of him. I could only keep out of the risk of injury from him by foregoing my right to walk in the public streets. Therefore to make you and other masters careful in the choice of servants to whom you give the means of mischief, you and other masters must compensate for that mischief when it happens." Now I do not say that is a sufficient reason, but it is the only one I know of, and it is not a reason applicable to the case of one servant injuring another, for then
