sphere of its action, as it is outside the sphere of theirs. What, then, are the former things? 'Opinions and impulses, desires and aversions'—briefly, that which a man does as opposed to that which he suffers. 'And these things,' he adds, 'are, in their nature, free, not liable to forbiddance or embarrassment.' So that Epictetus starts with announcing that the business and concern of the real self is with matters absolutely subject to its own control, absolutely uninfluenced by external chance or change. How important this announcement is will only appear by meditation and realisation: that it is true there can be no doubt—there is nothing essentially good for us which we cannot have if we only desire it strongly enough.
Again, in Ench. i. ε he teaches that when we are tried by misfortune we should never let our suffering overwhelm the sense of inward mastery and freedom expressed in the thought, 'It is nothing to me'—it has no
