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THE ENCHEIRIDION.
that which seems to harm him, just as it is impossible that he should take delight in the very injury itself.
δ. And thus it is that a father is reviled by his son when he will not give him a share of the things that are thought to be good. And it was this that set Polyneices and Eteocles at war with each other, the opinion, namely, that royalty was a good. And through this the Gods are blamed by the husbandman and the sailor, by the merchant and by those who lose their wives or children. For when advantage is, there also is religion. So that he who is careful to desire and to dislike as he ought is careful at the same time of religion.[1]
- ↑ εὐσέβεια is the Greek word which I have translated by 'religion' in this chapter. It is derived from σέβομαι, which means to have a pious regard, reverent respect or awe, towards some person or thing, God or man, or ancient custom, &c. Epictetus seems to think that a man may have a good religion or a bad one. If he cares only for material pleasures, he will have respect, enthusiasm, 'religion,' only for the sources of such pleasures. But if he desires what is truly good, he will necessarily have these feelings towards the Gods, i.e. the powers that make for goodness. Hence by rightly regulating his desires and aversions he ensures that his religion shall be rightly directed. Compare the Discourses of Epictetus, ii. 23 (Mr. Long's translation), 'For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attracted to nothing so much as its own interest . . . . this is father, and brother, and kinsman, and country, and God;' and
ε. But
