partan of freedom. The Greek cities were to be liberated from ile in the all-absorbing tyranny of Athens. Now, however, Sparta altogether failed to redeem these pledges. On the contrary she aimed at setting up a tyranny of her own. Oligarchical governments were established, controlled in each city by a Spartan garrison under a Spartan harmost or military governor. The earliest and one of the worst cases was the tyranny of the thirty tyrants at Athens, set up by Lysander, and supported by Spartan arms until, after eight . months, the Athenian exiles under Thrasybulus marched from Phyle upon Athens. The Athenian democracy was formally restored in September 403 B.C. ; and the liberators used their victory with a wise moderation. Four years later Socrates was put to death, because a party blindly zealous for the old beliefs of Athens could not see that such thought as his led to the only firm basis for a new social order.
The retreat of the 10,000 Greeks under Xenophon, in 401 B.C., marks a turning-point in the relations of Greece to Persia. It was to the Greeks a striking revelation of Persian weakness, an encouragement to schemes of invasion which would before have seemed wild. Sparta now began a war against the Persians in Asia Minor partly to escape from the reproach of having abandoned Asiatic Hellas to the barbarian. Agesilaus, on whom the lesson of the famous retreat had not been lost, was encouraged by success to plan a bolder campaign. But in 394 B.C. the Athenian Conon, commanding the fleet raised by the satrap Pharnabazus, utterly defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. Soon afterwards, under his protection, the Long Walls of Athens were restored. The Spartan power in Asia Minor was at an end. The oligarchies were overthrown, and the Spartan governors expelled.
The reverses of Sparta did not end here. At the instigation of Persia an alliance was formed between Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth. In the territory of the latter state the allies waged war on Sparta, to whose aid Agesilaus was recalled from Asia. When the Corinthian War had eace of lasted six years, the peace of Antalcidas was negotiated ntal- between Sparta and Persia (387 B.C.). By it the Greek cities Jas> in Asia, with Cyprus, were given up to Persia. Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were assigned to Athens. All other Greek cities were declared independent. The meaning of this was that they were to be independent of each other isolated for purposes of defence and all alike dependent on the Great King. The Corinthian War had begun from Persian intrigue ; it ended with a peace dictated by Persia. But the Spartan policy had gained its own ends. The so- called " autonomy " of the Greek cities disarmed the rivals of Sparta. Now, as at the end of the Peloponnesian War, a prospect of dominion was opened to her. The Persian king, whom this disgraceful peace practically recognized as suzerain of Greece, was to be merely the guarantor of terms under which Spartan ambition might be securely pursued.
A few years later these designs met with their first serious check. In 382 B.C. the Spartans treacherously seized the Cadmea or citadel of Thebes. They held Thebes for evolu-" three years. But in 379 a party of Theban exiles, under on at Pelopidas, surprised the Spartan garrison and recovered the jes> city. A still greater discouragement to Sparta was the ew _ establishment of a new Athenian Confederacy precautions theman being taken against the members passing, as under the on/ ~~ Delian Confederacy, into the condition of mere tributaries. Thebes joined the new confederacy, and presently suc ceeded in restoring the old Boeotian league, of whLh Thebes was the head. But the rise of Thebes had excited Athenian jealousy. Peace was made in 371 between Athens and Sparta. Thebes, thus isolated, was at once attacked by the Lacedaemonians. They invaded Bceotia, but were de- feated by the Thebans under Epaminondas at Leuctra, Thebs 371 B.C. This destroyed Spartan power outside of the vic t r Peloponnesus. Epaminondas next invaded the Pelopon- * Lei nesus itself. He resolved to set up rivals to Sparta on her owu borders. He therefore united the cities of Arcadia Epam into a league, with a new 7 city, Megalopolis, for its capital ; nontk and he gave independence to Messenia, which for three centuries had been subject to Sparta laying the found ations of a new capital, Messene, around the great natural citadel of Ithome. The Arcadian league did not long hold together. Mantinea led a group of Arcadian towns favour able to Sparta. In 362 B.C. a battle was fought near Mantinea between the Spartans and the Thebans. The Thebans were victorious, but Epaminondas fell. With his death the temporary supremacy of Thebes came to an end. Sparta had, however, been reduced from the rank of a leading state. Xenophon closes his Hellenica with these words : " There was more confusion (d/cptcna) and tumult in Greece after the battle than before."
Political confusion is indeed the general characteristic of the period between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the Macedonian conquest of Greece. In the preceding century Athens and Sparta had been the vigorous representatives of two distinct principles. The oligarchic cities B.C. rallied round Sparta, the democratic round Athens. But at the end of the Peloponnesian War Athens was exhausted. Sparta, now predominant, but suffering from inner decay, exercised her power in such a manner as to estrange her natural allies. Thus both the normal groups of states were broken up. New and arbitrary combinations succeeded, seldom lasting long, since they were prompted merely by the interest or impulse of the hour. In this period of un stable politics the moment most promising, perhaps, for the future of Greece was when Athens had formed a new naval confederacy, and was also allied with the Boeotian league. But the alliance was broken by Athenian jealousy of Thebes, not to be renewed until Greek independence was on the eve of receiving its death-blow. The work of Epaminondas in one sense died with him ; the brief hegemony of Thebes passed away. But in another sense the results which he achieved were enduring. He had been for Thebes such a man as Pericles was for Athens a ruling personal influence in a democratic commonwealth ; and he had raised Theban policy to the old Athenian level. The aims of Thebans were no longer confined to the circle of Theban interests; Thebes now aspired to be what Athens hid been the champion of national freedom and greatness. The power founded by Epaminondas was transient ; but this large Hellenic patriotism made itself felt in some degree as a permanent inspiration, preparing the Thebans to stand by the Athenians in the last struggle for Greek freedom.
VI. The reigns of Philip and Alexander, 359-323 B.C.
Three years after the death of Epaminondas Philip came to the throne of Macedon. His power rapidly grew. A warlike people, ruled by an able and ambitious king, was now the northern neighbour of Greece. The most obvious vice of Greek politics at this period was disunion ; but the disunion itself was only the symptom of a deeper decay. No one city of Greece any longer retained the vigour required in a leader. Had either Athens or Sparta now possessed such vital force as they showed in the Persian wars, no local or temporary feuds would have prevented the organization of national defence. Nothing marks the decay of the Greek commonwealths more significantly than the fact that they did not even recognize the urgency of the danger. Demosthenes had the old Greek spirit ; but he stood almost alone. The principles on which he constantly insisted, and which give unity to his entire career, are mainly
