action must be regulated by conscience, and that its religious obligations are the same as those of the individual man. It must therefore recognize and practise a religion, and the true religion is that of the Christian Church, of which the English Establishment is a branch. That religion, with its divinely organized system of Episcopacy, the state should enforce in every way short of physical persecution. It should exclude heretics from office and privilege, but it should not put them in prison. Mr Gladstone s book was the occasion of a controversy which doubtless had some effect on sub sequent political events. Macaulay 1 stated the Whig view of the subject holding that while the state may justi fiably endow an established church, it may not persecute for dissent in any way whatever. Government has princi pally to deal with the material wants of society, and with the protection of life and property. While this is the main end of government, it may pursue such secondary ends as the promotion of education and religion, the encouragment of arts, &c., but the primary end must not be sacrificed to the secondary end. The state is therefore not a moral person at all, any more than a mil way company or a hospital ; and government is certainly not an institution for the pro motion of religion ; but, if it finds it expedient, it may justly support Presbyterianism in Scotland, Protestant Episcopacy in England, and Roman Catholicism in Ireland. It is needless to say that Macaulay makes no attempt to define the limits within which the government may thus provide for the good of society. These may be said to have been the views of Liberal politicians and latitudinarian church men. On the other hand, the religious theory of govern ment, as expounded in Dr Arnold s Oxford Lectures on History, is based on the conception that the ideal church and state are one. Here there can be no bounds to the legitimate action of the state except its conformity with religious truth. And Dr Arnold does not hesitate to fore- cist an ideal state of society in which disbelief in the Christian religion shall so outrage the moral sense of the community that it may fittingly be put down by the strong arm of the law. The weakness of all theological specula tions about government is that they are fitted only for local use. The theory of government cannot well be discussed to much purpose with a disputant who requires a series of theological propositions to be taken for granted.
The Laissez-faire Theory.—Mill.—A more profitable line of inquiry has been followed by writers of the economical school. The most important of these is John Stuart Mill, V7hose essay on Liberty, together with the concluding chapters of his treatise on Political Economy, gives a tolerably complete view of the principles of government. The leaning of political economists is towards what is called the laissez-faire or non-interference doctrine. There is a general presumption against the interference of Govern ment, which is only to be overcome by very strong evidence of necessity. Governmental action is generally less effective than voluntary action. The necessary duties of Govern ment are so burdensome, that to increase them destroys its efficiency. Its powers are already so great that indi vidual freedom is constantly in danger. As a general rule, nothing which can be done by the voluntary agency of individual? should be left to the state. Each man is the best judge of his own interests. But, on the other hand, when the thing itself is admitted to be useful or necessary, and it cannot be effected by voluntary agency, or when it is of such a nature that the consumer cannot be considered capable of judging of the quality supplied, then Mr Mill would allow the state to interpose. Thus the education of children, and even of adults, would fairly come within the province of the state. Mr Mill even goes so far as to
1 Critical and Historical Essays, vol. i.
admit that, where a restriction of the hours of labour, or the establishment of a periodical holiday, is proved to be beneficial to labourers as a class, but cannot be carried out voluntarily on account of the refusal of individuals to co-operate, Government may justifiably compel them to co operate. Still further, Mr Mill would desire to see some control exercised by the Government over the operations of those voluntary associations which, consisting of large numbers of shareholders, necessarily leave their affairs in the hands of one or a few persons. In short, Mr Mill s general rule against state action admits of many important exceptions, founded on no principle less vague than that of public expediency. The essay on Liberty is mainly concerned with freedom of individual character, and its arguments apply to control exercised, not only by the state, but by society in the form of public opinion. The leading principle is that of Humboldt, " the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity." Humboldt broadly excluded education, religion, and morals from the action, direct and indirect, of the state, Mill, as we have seen, conceives education to be within the province of the state, but he would confine its action to compelling parents to educate their children.
Herbert Spencer.—The most thoroughgoing opponent of state action, however, is Mr Herbert Spencer. In his Social Statics, published in 1850, he holds it to be the essential duty of Government to protect to maintain men s rights to life, to personal liberty, and to property; and the theory that the Government ought to undertake other offices besides that of protector he regards as an untenable theory. Each man has a right to the fullest exercise of all his faculties, compatible with the same right in others. This is the funda mental law of equal freedom, which it is the duty and the only duty of the state to enforce. If the state goes beyond this duty, it becomes, not a protector, but an aggressor. Thus all state regulations of commerce, all religious estab lishments, all Government relief of the poor, all state systems of education and of sanitary superintendence, even the state currency and the post-office, stand condemned, not only as ineffective for their respective purposes, but as involving violations of man s natural liberty. Many of the principles enunciated in this book are not reconcilable with the later views of the author, but he would still appear to maintain his theory of government to the fullest extent. Thus, in the Principles of Sociology, published in 1877, he distinguishes between the militant type of society and the industrial type. The former is framed on the principle of compulsory co-operation, while the latter is framed on the principle of voluntary co-operation. He vaguely indicates " a possible future social type, differing as much from the industrial as this does from the militant, a type which, having a sustaining system more fully developed than any one known at present, will use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant organization nor ex clusively for material aggrandizement, but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities." Of the two actually existing types, the militant is distinguished by a strong and the industrial by a feeble Governmental system. Reversing the analogy suggested by individual organisms, he holds the latter to be a higher and better type than the former. 2 And he maintains that military activity in a state dis tinguished by a high degree of industrial development produces a recurrence to the militant type of institutions generally. Thus, in Germany, the dealings of Bismarck with the ecclesiastical powers, and the measures taken for
2 Principles of Sociology, vol. i., London, 1877. In a postscript to part ii. Mr Spencer explains the " origin of this seeming incongruity." Individual organisms, high or low, have to maintain their lives by offensive or defensive activities or both ; social organisms, except during the militant stage of their evolution, have not.
