Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 18.djvu/665

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HISTORY. PERSIA 635 bekir, the rallying-point of the White Sheep Turkmans. One authority (Zeno) states that in the following year Isma il entered upon a new campaign in Kurdistan and Asia Minor, but that he returned to Tabriz without accom plishing his object, having been harassed by the tactics of Alau d-Daulah, a beylarbey, or governor in Armenia and parts of Syria. Another, ignoring these movements, says that he marched against Murdd Khan in Irak:-* Aj mi ( Irak- Adjemi) and Shir/iz. This last account is ex tremely probable, and would show that the young Turkman had wished to make one grand effort to save Ispahan and Shiraz (with Kazvin and the neighbouring country), these being, after the capital Tabriz, the most important cities of Uzun Hasan s Persia. His men, however, apparently dismayed at the growing prestige of the enemy, did not support him, and he was defeated and put to flight. One writer says that he was slain in battle; and, since he appears to have made no further attempt on Persia, the statement is perhaps correct. There is similar evidence of the death of Alamut, who, it is alleged, was treacher ously handed over to be killed by the shah s own hands. , oest Isma il returned again to Tabriz (1501) "and caused ^ , great rejoicings to be made on account of his victory." In 1503 he had added to his conquests Baghdad, Mosul, and Jazirah on the Tigris. The next year he was called to the province of Gilan to chastise a refractory ruler. Having accomplished his end, he came back to his capital and remained there in comparative quiet till 1507. 1 Malcolm s dates are somewhat at variance with the above, for he infers that Baghdad was subdued in that particular year ; but the facts remain. All writers seem to agree that in 1508 the king s attention was drawn to an inva sion of Khurasan by Shaibani, or Shahi Beg, the Uzbek, a descendant of Jengliiz and the most formidable opponent of Babar, from whom he had, seven years before, wrested the city of Samarkand, and whom he had driven from Turkestan to Kabul. Since these exploits he had obtained great successes in Tashkand, FargMna, Hissar, Kunduz, and Khwarizm (Kharezm), and, at the time referred to, had left Samarkand intent upon mischief south and west of the Oxus, had passed the Murghab, and had reached Sarakhs. Isma il encamped on this occasion at Ispahan, and there concentrated the bulk of his army, strengthening his northern (and probably north-eastern) frontier with large bodies of cavalry. Zeno s statement that the royal troops were kept for the whole year in a state of suspense and preparation for encountering their powerful adversaries derives a colour of truth from the circumstance that, before the Uzbek army of invasion could have quite overrun the Khurasan of Husain Mirza, it found occupation to the eastward in Herat and Kandahar ; and it must have been represented, even in Mashhad, Nishapiir, Astrabad, and Turshiz all named as the scenes of conflict rather by lieutenants than by the leader in person. Such diversion from any direct invasion of his own territories may have caused the shah to maintain an attitude of simple watch fulness. In 1510, when Shaibani had invaded Khurasan the second time, and in person, and had entered the fine province of Mazandaran then in the possession of an inde pendent chief it was discovered that his troops, in the wantonness of success, had ravaged the Persian province of Karman. Shah Isma il had asked for redress, referring to the land encroached on as "hereditary" ; and ShaiMni had replied that he did not understand on what was founded the claim "to inherit." Mutual taunt and recrimination followed ; and eventually the Persian troops were put in movement, and the Uzbeks, having been divided into small detachments scattered over the country, fell back and retreated to Herat. Their leader, howeve r, 1 Angiolello. not being in a position to oppose the shah in the field, 1499-1514. repaired to Merv, where he could obtain sufficient rein forcements, or whence he could, if hard pushed, retire across the Oxus. Isma il quickly followed him there, and enticed him out to battle by the use of taunt and reproach at his remaining within walls. Shaibani was defeated and fled, but was overtaken in his flight, surrounded, and put to the sword, together with numerous relatives and companions (see MONGOLS, vol. xvi. p. 749). The next remarkable event in Isma il s reign is his war War with Sultan Salim I. Its origin may be traced to the ith Ottoman emperor s hatred and persecution of all heretical ir Moslems in his dominions, and the shah s anger at the fanaticism which had urged him to the slaughter of 40,000 Turks suspected to have thrown off the orthodox Sunni doctrines. The declaration of war sent by Salim in the form of a letter is one of the most singular of documents, and breathes the true spirit of the age : "I, the glorious Sultan . . . address myself to thee, Amir Isma il, chief of the Persian troops, who art like in tyranny to Zohak and Afrasiab, and art destined to perish like the last Dara." Words such as these might well provoke a less haughty potentate than the Sufi ; and, when to them was added the accusation of iniquity, perjury, blasphemy, impiety, heresy, and schism, it is not surprising that the response was a ready resort to arms. 2 As a preliminary, however, to this decisive step Isma il replied to the sultan in a calm and dignified letter, denying the existence of a casm lelli, expressing willingness to resume peaceful relations, and regretting the mode of address it had been thought fit to adopt towards himself ; but he nullified the conciliatory passages by the ironical conclusion that the sultan s com munication must have emanated from the brain of a secre tary who had taken an overdose of narcotics,- a remark the significance of which was aggravated by the accom paniment of a box of opium, and the popular belief that Salim was addicted to the use of the drug. The sultan s army advanced into Adarbaijan and Avestern Persia through Tokat and Arzinjan. Isma il had at this time the greater number of his soldiers employed in his newly-conquered province of Khurasan, and was driven to raise new levies in Kurdistan to obtain a sufficient force to resist the invasion. It is asserted by some that his frontier then extended westward to Sivas, a city situated in a large high plain watered by the Kizil Irmak, and that thence to Khoi, 90 miles west of Tabriz, he followed the approved and often successful tactics of ravaging and retreating, so as to deprive his advancing enemy of sup plies. There is good evidence to show that the Turkish janissaries were within an ace of open revolt, and that but for extraordinary firmness in dealing with them they would have abandoned their leader in his intended march upon Tabriz. In fine, at or near Khoi, the frontier- town of Adarbaijan, the battle (1514) was fought between the two rival monarchs, ending in the defeat of the Persians and the triumphant entry of Salim into their capital. There are stirring accounts of that action and of the gallant deeds performed by Salim and Isma il, both person ally engaged in it, as well as by their generals. 3 Others maintain that Isma il was not present at all. 4 It is tolerably 2 Creasy s History of (he Ottoman Turks. 3 Kuolles, Malcolm, Creasy, Markham, &c. 4 Zeno. Angiolello says that " the Sophi monarch had left for Tauris [Tabriz] in order to assemble more troops." Krusinski infers much to the same effect, for he notes that " Selim came in person and took Tauris from Ismail, but at the noise of his approach was obliged to retreat with precipitation." The battle must thus have been fought and the victory gained when the shah was himself absent. Yet Markham quotes a journal which thus records his feats of prowess : " It was in vain that the brave Shah, with a blow of his sabre, severed a chain with which the Turkish guns were fastened together to resist the shock of the Persian cavalry."