WALLENSTEIN 329 Having established peace in Hungary, WalJenstein pro ceeded, in 1627, to clear Silesia of some remnants of Mansfeld s army ; and at this time he bought from the emperor the duchy of Sagan, his outlay in the conduct of the war being taken into account in the conclusion of the bargain. He then joined Tilly in the struggle with Christian IV., and afterwards took possession of the duchy of Mecklenburg, which was granted to him in reward for his services, the hereditary dukes being displaced on the ground that they had helped the Danish king. He failed to capture Stralsund, which he besieged for several months in 1628. This was his first important reverse, and it caused him bitter disappointment, for he had hoped that by obtain ing free access to the Baltic he might be able to make the emperor as supreme at sea as he seemed to be on land. It was a part of Wallenstein s scheme that he should ob tain possession of the Hanseatic towns, and through them destroy the naval power of the Scandinavian kingdom, the Netherlands, and England. This plan completely broke down when he was compelled to withdraw his troops from the brave city which he had sworn to take even if it were bound with chains to heaven. Notwithstanding this check, the imperial cause prospered; and early in 1629 Christian IV. was obliged to accept terms of peace. About the same time Ferdinand issued the famous edict of restitution, which excited deep resentment in every Protestant state in the realm. Meanwhile Wallenstein had made for himself a host of enemies among the princes of the empire. They regarded him as an upstart, and complained of the incessant exactions of his army. Moreover, it was by no means clear what he intended to do with the great force he had gathered around him. He was sometimes heard to speak ominously of the arrogance of the princes, and it appeared probable that he might try to bring them, Catholics and Protestants alike, into rigid subjection to the crown. Again and again, there fore, the emperor was advised to dismiss him from his command. Ferdinand was very unwilling to part with one who had served him so well ; but the demand was pressed so urgently by the electors in 1630 that he had no alter native, and in September of that year envoys were sent to Wallenstein to announce his removal. Had the emperor declined to take this course, the princes would probably have combined against him ; and the result would have been a civil war even more serious than that which had already brought so many disasters upon the country. This was perfectly understood by Wallenstein, who therefore accepted the emperor s decision calmly, and retired to Gitschin, the capital of his duchy of Friedland. Some months before the dismissal of Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus had landed in Germany, and it soon became obvious that he was by far the most formidable of the enemies with whom the emperor had yet had to con tend. Tilly was defeated at Breitenfeld and in the battle of the Lech, where he received a mortal wound ; and Gustavus advanced to Munich, while Bohemia was occupied by his allies the Saxons. After the battle of Breitenfeld the emperor entreated Wallenstein to come once more to his aid. Wallenstein at first declined ; he had, indeed, been secretly negotiating with Gustavus Adolphus, in the hope that he might thus be able to maintain his hold over his great possessions. In the end, however, he accepted the offers made to him by Ferdinand, and in the spring of 1632 he took the field with an army of more than 40,000 men. This army was placed absolutely under his control, so that he assumed the position of an independent prince rather than of an ordinary subject. His first aim was to drive the Saxons from Bohemia, an object which he accomplished without serious diffi culty. Then he advanced against Gustavus Adolphus, who attacked him near Nuremberg on the 3d of September, but was driven back. On the 16th of November 1632 a decisive battle was fought at Lu tzen, in Saxony. In this battle the imperialists were routed, but Gustavus Adolphus was killed. To the dismay of Ferdinand, Wallenstein made no use of the opportunity provided for him by the death of the Swedish king, but withdrew to winter quarters in Bohemia. In the campaign of 1633 much astonishment was caused by his apparent unwillingness to attack the enemy. The truth was that he was preparing to desert the emperor. That he sincerely desired to secure for Germany the benefits of peace is probable enough, but it is certain that he was also resolved to make for himself a position of command ing importance. He entered into negotiations with Saxony, Brandenburg, Sweden, and France ; and one of his condi tions was that the possession of the kingdom of Bohemia should be guaranteed to him. He had vast and somewhat vague schemes for the reorganization of the entire constitu tional system of the empire, and he himself was to have supreme authority in determining the political destinies of his country. Irritated by the distrust excited by his proposals, and anxious to make his power felt, he at last assumed the offensive, and in October he defeated the Swedes at Steinau. Soon afterwards he entered Lusatia and took Gorlitz and Bautzen, and despatched a troop of cavalry as far as Berlin. He then resumed the negotiations, and pressed for a full and final acceptance of his plans. In December he retired with his army to Bohemia, fixing his headquarters at Pilsen. It had soon been suspected in Vienna that Wallenstein was playing a double part, and the emperor, encouraged by the Spaniards at his court, anxiously sought for means of getting rid of him. Wallenstein was well aware of the designs formed against him, but displayed little energy in his attempts to thwart them. This was due in part, no doubt, to ill health, in part to the fact that he trusted to the assurances of his astrologer, Seni, with whom he often conferred. He also felt confident that when the time came for his army to decide between him and the emperor the decision would be in his own favour. His principal officers assembled around him at a banquet on the 12th January 1634, when he submitted to them a declaration to the effect that they would remain true to him. This declaration they signed. More than a month later a second paper was signed ; but on this occasion the officers expression of loyalty to their general was associated with an equally emphatic expression of loyalty to their emperor. By this time Wallenstein had learned that he had too easily allowed himself to be lulled into a sense of security, and that he needed to act warily. On the 24th of January the emperor had signed a secret patent remov ing him from his command and requiring the army to obey Count Gallas ; and imperial agents had been labouring to undermine Wallenstein s influence. Another patent charging Wallenstein and two of his officers with high treason, and naming the generals who were to assume the supreme command of the army, was signed on the 18th February, and published in Prague. When Wallenstein heard of the publication of this patent, he realized the full extent of his danger, and on the 23d February, accompanied by several of his most intimate friends, and guarded by about 1000 men, he went from Pilsen to Eger, hoping to obtain the protection of the Protestant general Bernard of Weimar. After the arrival of the party at Eger, Colonel Gordon, the commandant, and Colonels Butler and Leslie agreed to rid the emperor of his enemy. On the evening of the 25th February Wallenstein s supporters Illo, Kinsky, Terzky, and Neumann
XXIV. 42