364 WAR [NAVAL STRATEGY fighting ships dependent on their supply of coal, when we have taken into consideration the cutting of the Suez Canal and the possibility of another through Panama, and when we have given due weight to the possession by various nations of certain strategic points on the surface of the globe where coal may be obtained, we shall be able to construct some not altogether imaginary theories of future naval strategy, and shall probably find that the problem, at least as between Great Britain and her maritime rivals, bears a striking family resemblance to that which presented itself in the past. The geographical factors are not greatly altered. Some new naval powers have sprung into existence, and must be taken account of, whilst some of those which figured conspicuously in the beginning of the century have dwindled into insignificance; but the relative interests of the two great maritime rivals, Great Britain and France, are practically unchanged. rategy. Strategy. The great continental powers of Europe, in consequence of their land frontiers, have to depend mainly on their armies to defend their position, and maintain their independence, and they have all been constrained to adopt a system of forced military service, and to support great standing armies, with prodigious reserves, and vast stores of war material constantly at hand. For them the problems with which we are now dealing are questions of minor importance, and must be held entirely subordinate to their military requirements. Italy is probably the only one of them which has reason to fear invasion by sea, or descents and raids upon her extended coast line ; and she has lately been making gigantic efforts to supply herself with a powerful war navy, though she is still far behind France, the only power from whom she has any cause to rategic apprehend attack. To Great Britain alone of the great oblemsof powers of Europe are the problems of naval strategy of ramount p aramoun t importance. Upon a thorough knowledge and Great 106 J ust appreciation of them, with a sufficient provision of itain. physical force to secure their successful development in her own interests, depends the existence of the British empire. The two primary factors which must decide the future naval strategy of Great Britain are the command of the English Channel and the protection of her mercantile marine. Upon the former depends her own safety from invasion, or from partial but disastrous raids upon her open commercial cities and coast towns; and upon the latter depends the no less vital consideration of the uninterrupted supply of food and of raw material for manufacture. Her naval supremacy in the Mediterranean is of vast importance, for upon it will depend the freedom of her principal route to India and Australia, and also the eventual retention of Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus, and of that priceless possession vaguely termed naval prestige, upon which alone she can found a claim to be classed amongst the great powers of Europe. But, notwithstanding the importance to Great Britain of being able to hold her own in the Mediterranean, either with or without allies, in the event of a war with France, or with France and Russia combined, it cannot be considered as vital to the exist ence of the empire ; and it is possible to conceive circum stances in which she might be driven from that sea, or for strategic reasons be induced temporarily to withdraw her ships, and yet, if she could keep open her alternative trade route by the Cape of Good Hope, and protect her food supplies from America, she might secure time to develop her unrivalled maritime resources, and eventually, notwithstanding the enormous temporary loss of prestige, regain her wonted supremacy on all seas. The naval strategy of the past was necessarily a some what inexact and haphazard business. The fact that fleets had to depend entirely for locomotion upon the fickle and uncertain power of wind rendered it impossible to form accurate schemes of combination, and thus the most carefully planned expeditions and enterprises were often frustrated and rendered abortive almost at the moment of consummation by a foul wind or storm. All this is now changed ; the present development of steam- power renders fleets practically independent of wind, and even storms can only slightly affect them. The limit to their range of operations dependent on their coal supply, with the question of the possibility of replenishing, adds another element of certainty to the data upon which we can form accurate calculations as to the power and mobility of fleets. It has become possible, therefore, to say that naval strategy is no longer the inexact and haphazard busi ness, depending largely on chance, which it was of old, but an accurate and most interesting science, worthy of the close attention and practical study of the most skilled experts. The two principal objects of the naval strategy of Great Britain the command of the narrow seas around her coasts, and the protection of her mercantile marine are to a certain extent different, though not actually inde pendent of each other. Thus she might, by providing an overwhelming fleet of iron-clads, and neglecting to build a sufficiency of fast cruisers, retain undisputed command of the narrow seas, and yet have her commerce swept off the ocean by an enemy provided with numerous fast, far-ranging cruisers ; and on the other hand, it would be useless for her to provide vast numbers of vessels of the latter class to protect her commerce all over the world, if by neglecting her iron-clads she lost command of the narrow seas, and saw her merchant ships captured in sight of their ports. It is obvious, therefore, that her only safety depends upon an ample supply of both. The naval strategy of the last war may be briefly but Blockade of comprehensively described as a blockade of the enemy s enem y s ports. The question which now exercises the minds of p01 s seamen is whether blockade is at present possible, and if so under what conditions ; and the conclusion which seems to have been arrived at by the ablest naval strategists of the present day appears to be that a close blockade, carried on under the old system, is, for various reasons, no longer possible. What is now practicable is observation, or watching by a chain of look-out vessels in connexion with a superior fleet, in such a way that the squadron in port would be masked (to use a military term), or in other words, that they would be unable to leave the port with out the extreme probability of being obliged to meet and engage with a superior force. The distance at which the masking fleet should remain from the blockaded port, and the question whether they should be kept under weigh, or at anchor at some suitable anchorage, are points of detail which come more under the head of tactics, and must be decided in each individual case in accordance with local circumstances, and with such considerations as the prospect of the blockading fleet being or not being subjected to the attacks of torpedo boats and coast de fenders, which, although not strictly speaking sea-going vessels, are yet capable of exercising potent energies within a certain zone of their port, by selecting the most suitable time and weather for their operations. Such considera tions render it obvious that the blockading ships must greatly exceed the sea-going force in the port blockaded, as they render themselves liable to all sorts of subsidiary but very effective attacks from comparatively insignificant forces, which, in consequence of their own distance from their base of operations, they would be unable to reply to in a similar manner. If the blockading force is to be kept constantly under weigh, its numbers must be still further increased, as in that case a certain proportion of the ships, variously estimated at from one-sixth to one-
third, must be continually absent from their station for