Tirazia, an important recent suburban extension along the line of the aqueduct or Tirazi. Since 1869 great activity has been shown in building, and the Old Town is gradually being regulated according to a definite plan. The general appearance of the place is growing more and more European ; its mosques and minarets, protected from actual demolition by a Turkish treaty, are falling into ruin from neglect. As the seat of the Servian Government, and the residence of the prince and the archbishop, Belgrade possesses a royal and an episcopal palace, a foreign and a home office, and other public buildings. Its educational institutions are remarkably numerous, consisting of a high school, several normal schools, a gymnasium, a theological seminary, a military academy, an industrial school, and an upper school for girls. There is a theatre devoted to the development of the national drama; and in the same building with the high school there is preserved a valuable collection of national antiquities as well as an extensive library. Besides the mosques, the ecclesiastical buildings include a cathedral and several Greek churches, a Roman Catholic chapel in the Austrian embassy, and an evangelical church. Among places of historical interest are the ruins of Prince Eugene s palace, and the monument in the Topjidere park on the spot -where Prince Michael was assassinated in 1868. The citadel has been already mentioned; a commandant s resi dence, barracks, and a military hospital are among its sub sidiary buildings. Though its situation is highly conducive to mercantile activity, the commerce of Belgrade is not so great as would naturally be anticipated. It holds, however, direct commercial relations not only with Vienna and Con stantinople but with Manchester. There are only two monetary establishments, one known as the " First Bank," and the other a bank of credit. The principal industrial products of the city are cotton-stuffs, carpets, leather, and lire-arms. Belgrade is identified with the ancient Singi- dunum, and was the station of the Legio IV. Flavia Felix. It has from its earliest existence been a place of military importance, and in modern times has sustained many sieges, and repeatedly passed from the hands of the Austrians to those of the Turks. It was taken by Soliman II. in 1521, and retaken by the Austrians in 1688, but again lost in 1690. In 1717 it surrendered to Prince Eugene. The imperialists retained it till 1739, when the Turks invested and reduced it. Austria again took it in 1789, but it was restored at the peace of 1791. In the year 1806 the Servian insurgents succeeded in carrying it. In 1862 it was bombarded from the citadel on account of a contest raging between the Turkish and Servian inhabitants, but five years later it was completely evacuated by the foreign forces, and the citadel received a garrison of Servian soldiers. The only mark of Turkish occupation is the banner which continues to be shown from its walls along
with the national colours. Population in 1872, 26,674.BELIEF (πίστις, Fides, Foi, Glaube), with its synonyms Assurance, Confidence, Conviction, Credence, Trust, Persuasion, Faith, is in popular language taken to mean the acceptation of something as true which is not known to be true, the mental attitude being a conviction that is not so strong as certainty, but is stronger than mere opinion. For the grounds of such conviction, ordinary language refers at once to probable as opposed to intuitive or demonstra tive evidence. Such popular phrases do not, of course, amount to a definition of belief; but this is not to be expected from them, especially if, as may be laid down with some confidence, no logical definition of the process be possible. It may be described and marked off from similar or contrasted states, but a rigidly scientific defini- tion^of what appears to be a simple, ultimate fact is not attainable. The general explanation, however, is so far unsatisfactory in that it throws no light upon the most interesting question with regard to belief, its province, and does not tell us what are the objects of belief as opposed to those of knowledge. To answer this it is necessary to describe somewhat more minutely the mental process under examination.
belief is used in a variety of relations which seem at first sight to have but little in common. We are said to believe in what lies beyond the limits of our temporal experience, in the supersensible, in God and a future life. Again, we are said to believe in the first principles or ultimate verities from which all trains of demonstration must start ; as conditions of demonstration, these are themselves inde monstrable, and are therefore objects of belief.[1] We receive by belief perceptions of single matters of fact, which from their very nature cannot be demonstrated.[2] We believe from memory the facts of past experience ; we have expectation or belief in future events. We accept truths on the evidence of testimony ; and finally, we believe that our actual consciousness of things is in harmony with reality. From this unsystematic arrangement of objects of belief it will be possible to eliminate certain classes by noting in the first instance what we are not said to believe, but to know. By knowledge may be understood generally the conviction of truth which rests on grounds valid for all intelligence, and which is expressed in proposi tions necessary both for our thinking and for reality. At the same time we are commonly and correctly said to know states of consciousness when they are immediately present, together with their differences, similarities, connections, and relations to self. Whatever is necessarily connected with pre sent experience, and can be logically deduced from it, is also matter not of belief but of knowledge. Again, we know all propositions of apodictic certainty, such as those of mathematics and logic. Mathematical propositions carry us beyond mere thinking ; the laws which flow from the relations of space and time are not only thought but known to be true of all objects of sensible experience, for no objects whatsoever can form part of that experience save under these quantitative conditions. It is therefore an error to say that we believe abstract mathematical laws apply to objects ; we know this with absolute certainty. So also our cognizance of logical principles, such as the laws of identity and contradiction, is matter of knowledge, of insight, not of belief. It would appear, therefore, that know ledge extends to facts immediately present in conscious ness, and to certain relations true of all facts of sensible experience ; but in neither of these classes of cognition does there seem to be given an absolute guarantee for the exist ence of any fact which is not immediately before us. That one object presented to us is known seems to give no actual knowledge that another object ideally connected with it has at the same time real being. Mathematical and logical laws are absolutely true of all experience to which they apply, but this truth gives no certainty that there will be experience. If there be objects of experience at all, they must be subject to mathematical and logical law; but the question remains, is there any ground, absolutely necessary and compelling assent, for holding that there will be such
experience.[3] This is an old matter of debate ; it lies at- ↑ This has been pointed out by a long line of thinkers, from Aristotle to Jacob! and Hamilton.
- ↑ So knowledge through the senses is called 0/enbarung by Jacobi and Lotze (Mikrokosmus, iii. 548).
- ↑ Of. Lotze, Mik., iii. 547. " When one affirms that every object of thought is identical with itself, that the same under the same con ditions has the same consequences, under different conditions different consequences, that a cause precedes every effect, all these are universal truths, which tell us, indeed, what must be or take place if tl^re should fce a case of their application, but which tell us nothing of the real existence of any case."
