which conflict with this feeling, and to accept any which harmonize with it. The emotion controls the movements of anticipation and of intellectual attention, so that suitable ideas are at once recognized and detained. The unity of our most complex dreams appears to arise very largely from this source. In dreams described by Schemer, Volkelt, and Wundt the successions of imaginary events are clearly strung together by a thread of emotion, as joy, terror, and so on. The commonest example of such a dominating emotional tone in dreaming occurs when there is a current of pleasurable or painful feeling contributed by the condition of some of the internal organs of the body. These bodily sensations become the basis of complex groups of images, each new scene being connected with some
analogous shade of feeling, " bodily " or "mental."(C) The Objective Reality and Intensity of Dream- Imaginations. These are explained by Hartley by two circumstances, first, the absence of any other reality to oppose to the ideas which offer themselves ; and secondly, the greater vividness of the visible ideas which occur in dreams as measured by the corresponding waking ideas. This last fact may, he thinks, be partly accounted for by an increased heat of the brain. As already remarked, Dugald Stewart explains the reality of dreams through the suspension of the ordinary action of volition. In waking life, he says, ve distinguish objective impressions from ideas by finding that the former are independent of volition, while the latter are dependent on the same. Hence, in dreaming, when the will no longer controls ideas, these are mistaken for realities. The chief influences here concerned appear to be included in Hartley s theory, though the cir cumstances emphasized by Stewart may be a secondary element in the case. That the reality of dream-images depends in large part on the absence of external impressions has been recognized by most recent writers. Among others M. Taine (De V Intelligence) dwells on the function of external sensation as a corrective to internal imaginations, keeping these below the illusory stage. External impres sions are distinguished from ideas in the waking state, in part at least, by their greater intensity. When this relation is no longer recognized by reason either of the ideas acquiring preternatural vividness or of the sensations being withdrawn, illusion follows. Waking hallucinations depend on the first circumstance, dream-illusions on the second, perhaps also on the first as well. This leads us to the reflection that during sleep the ideas arising in consciousness undergo an increase of absolute as well as of relative vividness. That is to say, they are in themselves more intense states of consciousness than waking ideas. This seems to point, as Maury observes, to an increased ex citability of the nervous substance in sleep. This same circumstance, too, helps to account for the preternatural impressiveness and the exaggeration which meet us in dream-life. If the brain is during sleep peculiarly excitable it will follow that all sensational stimuli, external and internal alike, will produce an exaggerated result. Thus the intensity of sensations will be augmented, and their volume, and so the apparent magnitude of dream-images be increased. Again, if in dreaming the stream of fancies be a rapid one, if images simultaneously and successively crowd in on consciousness, we may understand how space and time may appear to swell to unusual proportions. Once more, the peculiar excitability of the brain will mani fest itself in an exaggeration of all feeling. Slight bodily discomforts, for example, will be transformed, as in Maury s experiments, into huge sufferings, and so locally circum scribed bodily sensations of pleasure may expand into pre ternatural forms of emotional delight.
We are now perhaps in a position to explain the symbolic function of dreams so much emphasized by Schemer. He considers that our dream-phantasy habitually represents the seat of bodily sensations under the symbol of a house and its parts, and the silent processes of thought as the audible conversation of living persons. The latter remark is probably correct, and its truth follows from a consideration of the close association between thought and audible speech. The former observation is surely an exaggerated statement, as has been shown by his friendly critic Yolkelt. Yet though bodily sensations do not as a rule reveal themselves under the symbol of a building or mass of buildings, they undoubtedly do appear in conscious ness disguised and transformed ; and the reasons of this are plain. Even in the waking condition we have but a vaguu consciousness of the seat of the bodily sensations, and in sleep this can hardly be present at all. In addition to this, the exaggerating influences just referred to must tend to disguise the real nature of bodily sensations, and so to remove all consciousness of their locality. Hence bodily sensations do as a rule clothe themselves in a disguise appearing under the form of emotional experiences. And the particular pleasurable or painful images selected, which will vary with the individual s emotional nature and experience, will be apt to recur as a "symbolic expression" of this variety of bodily feeling. It will follow, too, from the predominance of visual ideas in dreams, that these emotional fancies will commonly take the shape of alluring or alarming visual perceptions.
Dreaming is a subject of great interest by reason of its points of contact with other mental conditions. Thus the common suspension of many of the higher processes of emotion, thought, and volition suggests an analogy between the dreaming state and the instinctive stage of mental growth as observable in children, primitive men, and the lower animals. This aspect of dreams has been treated by Maury.
Again, dreaming has many curious resemblances to the mental states of the insane. The differences which mark off dreaming from these states have already been given. The resemblances between them are no less important. In the illusory intensity of its internal images, in the rapidity ot its flux of ideas, and in the wildness and incoherence of its combinations, the dream stands very close to the whole class of hallucinations and illusions of waking life. In truth, a systematic psychological treatment of dreams must connect them with other forms of illusion. This is done, for example, by Wundt, who refers all these groups of phenomena to an increased excitability of the sensory regions of the brain. Maury seems disposed to regard dreaming as the incipient stage of a pathological mental condition, of which somnambulism, insanity, <fcc., are more fully developed forms. Among other writers who have discussed dreams in relation to these other abnormal states of mind are Macario (op. cit.), Bierre de Boismont (Les Hallucinations), J Moreau (Die Ilaschisck et d Alienation Mentale), also Sir H. Holland, and Dr Carpenter (Mental Physiology).
A good deal of random and undigested information respecting dreams and dream-theories is to be found in Mr Frank Seafield s Literature and Curiosities of Dreams. A curious account of the ancients views of dreams is to be met with in a work entitled His- toire du Sonnambulism, par Austin Gautliier. For the best state ment of the modern theory of dreams, the student is referred to the works of Maury, Wundt, Carpenter, and Volkelt, already named. Dreams have been roughly classified according to the source of their images and the relative activity of association and imagination in volved, by Schemer, Volkelt, and others. The view of the pro cesses involved in the imaginative construction of dreams here adopted has been more fully developed by the present writer in au article in the Cornhill Magazine of November 1876.
