772 EVOLUTION on these many successions, to gather them up by a series of acts of imagination into a collective ideal experience for itself. Thus the doctrine of evolution seems to he susceptible of statement in terms of idealism as easily as in terms of real ism. In truth, each mode of viewing the process is at once possible and beset with difficulties. The difficulty of giving an idealistic interpretation arises from the popular distinc tion of mind or perception and something beyond and in dependent of this. The difficulties of giving a realistic in terpretation have in part been stated already in speaking of the different realistic interpretations (materialism and spiritualism). To these must be now added the fundamen tal obstacle to all realism, which shows itself, in a specially striking way, in relation to the doctrine of evolution, namely, the difficulty of conceiving in terms of human con sciousness something which is independent of, antecedent to, and creative of, this consciousness. It may be asked, perhaps, whether the doctrine of evolu tion, by providing a new conception of the genesis of our cognitions, has anything to say to the question of a real independent object. What the doctrine effects with respect to such cognitions as those of space is to show that the bare fact of intuitiveness or innateness does not establish j their non-empirical or transcendental origin. Similarly it j may be held that the doctrine opens a way of accounting for the growth of the idea of independent realities, suppos ing this to be now an innate disposition of the mind viz., by regarding this idea as arising in a succession of many generations, if not out of, yet by help of, certain elements or aspects of experience. It may, however, be maintained that the idea is not even suggested by experience; if so, it would follow from the evolution theory that its present persistence represents a permanent mental disposition to think in a particular way. Even then, however, the question would remain open whether the permanent dis position were an illusory or trustworthy tendency, and in deciding this point the doctrine of evolution appears to offer us no assistance. 1 As a scientific doctrine, whatever its ultimate interpreta tion, evolution has a bearing on our practical, i.e., moral and religious ideas. This has already been shown in part by writers from whom we have quoted. Among other results, this doctrine may be said to give new form to the determinist theory of volition, and to establish the rela tivity of all moral ideas as connected with particular stages of social development. It cannot, as Mr Sidgwick has shown, provide a standard or end of conduct except to those who are already disposed to accept the law sequi naturam as the ultimate rule of life. To such it furnishes an end, though it would still remain to show how the end said to be unconsciously realized by nature, the well-being of individuals and of communities, is to be adjusted to the ends recognized in common-sense morality, including the happiness of all sentient beings. It may be added that the doctrine, by assigning so great an importance to the laws of inheritance as means of raising the degree of organization and life, may be expected to exert an influence on our ideas of the solidarity of the present generation and posterity, and to add a certain solemnity to all the duties of life, prudential morality included. The bearing of the doctrine of evolution on religious ideas is not so easy to define. Mr Spencer considers the ideas of evolution and of a pre-existing mind incapable of being united in thought (see his rejoinder to Dr Martineau, Contemporary Review, voL xx. p. 141 sq.). Yet, according to 1 For a discussion of the relations of this doctrine to realism, see the essay already referred to in Mr Sully s volume Sensation and Intuition. others, the idea is by no means incompatible with the notion of an original Creator, though it serves undoubtedly to remove the action of such a being further from our ken. At first sight it might appear that the doctrine as applied to the subjective world, by removing the broad distinction between the human and the animal mind, would discourage the hope of a future life for man s soul. Yet it may be found, after all, that it leaves the question very much where it was. It may perhaps be said that it favours the old disposition to attribute immortality to those lower forms of mind with which the human mind is found to be con tinuous. Yet there is nothing inconsistent in the supposi tion that a certain stage of mental development qualifies a. mind for immortality, even though this stage has been reached by a very gradual process of development. And if, as might be shown, the modern doctrine of evolution is susceptible of being translated into terms of Leibnitz s hypothesis of indestructible monads, which include all grades of souls, then it is clearly not contradictory or the idea of immortality. Very interesting is the bearing of the doctrine of evolu tion on that resthetico-religious sentiment towards the world which has taken the place of older religious emotions in so many minds. First of all by destroying the old authro- pocentric view of nature, according to which she is distinct from and subordinated to man, this doctrine favours that pantheistic sentiment which reposes on a sense of ultimate identity between ourselves and the external world. In a sense it may be said that the new doctrine helps to restore the ancient sentiment towards nature as our parent, the source of our life. It is well to add, however, that the theory of evolution, by regarding man as the last and highest product of nature, easily lends support to the idea that all things exist and have existed for the sake of our race. This seems, indeed, to be an essential ele 1 ment in any conception we can form of a rationally evolved universe. A reference must be made, in closing this article, to the opti mistic aspect of the doctrine of evolution. That there is a tone of optimism in much of the more popular exposition of the doctrine of evolution needs not be proved. There is no doubt, too, that both in Mr Darwin s and Mr Spencer s theories there are ideas which tend to support a cheerful and contented view of things. The idea of the survival of the fittest, and of evolution as a gradual process of adapta tion to environment, lend themselves to this kind of thought. Indeed, Du Bois Reymond, in the lecture on Leibnitz already referred to, seriously argues that the doc- trineof evolution provides a scientific equivalent to that philo sopher s remarkable conception of the best of all possible worlds. On the other hand, as the present writer has else where shown, Mr Darwin s doctrine of evolution contains elements which are fitted to tone down our estimate of the value of the world viewed as the seat of conscious sentient life. The pain involved in the renewed struggle for ex istence is a large drawback from the gains of human pro gress and of organic development as a whole. More than this, the principle of natural selection appears almost to favour a pessimist view of the world, in so far as it im plies the tendency of organic forms to multiply down to the limits of bare existence. Principal works used in the historical sketch : F. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy ; J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss dcr Geschichte der Philosophic ; G. H. Lewes, History of Philosophy ; C. A. Brandi.-t, Handbuch dcr Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophie; E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der GrcicJicn; G. Grote, Plato and Aristotle; W. Kaulich, Geschichte der scholastischcn Philosophie ; A. Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters ; Kuno Fischer, Geschicht* der ncuern Philosophie ; J. P. Damiron, Memoirs pour servir <i VHistoire de la Philosophic au 18 Siecle ; E. Zeller, Geschichte d>n
dcutschen Philosophie. (J. S.)