204 WELLINGTON AND THE April were prepared to make large concessions if by doing so they could purchase the co-operation, secret or open, of Great Britain ; and it was during these three weeks and in that hope that these con- cessions were made.* Their first task was to discover to what extent Great Britain was prepared to conform to the policy of the allies, and, if she was not able to support them in any way, whether she would remain neutral in the event of war. That was the secret which, as Wellington afterwards confessed, he carried with him to the congress,^ and if Mettemich tried to discover that secret, I am unable to believe that he who was so rarely baffled was baffled here. The evidence for the truths of history must often be accidental, and there is no sure and certain proof that Wellington gave that secret away. The only confident assertion we can make is this, that whether the allies were in possession of this piece of information or not they acted and wrote as if they were.^ > ViMle, Mhnoirea, iii, 180, 194, 202, 223, Montmorency's dispatches of 5, 9, 11, 19 November.
- Wellington's Parliamentary Speeches, i. 112, 1854. ' The Government, however,
of which I had the honour of forming a part, determined on preserving a strict neutrality. My Lords, they sent me to Verona with instructions to that effect ; and, in conformity with the spirit of these instructions, I entered upon the negotiations, the merits of which your Lordships are this evening assembled to discuss ' (speech of 24 April 1823).
- According to Boislecomte, Wellington gave a very strong hint. He appeared to
have suggested that in a Franco-Spanish war England would remain neutral for economic and domestic reasons. These probably were the true reasons. The transition from war to peace, always a critical period in the history of nations, had not been unaccompanied by disturbances, and those disturbances were accentuated by the fact that we had not yet had time to accommodate ourselves to the new economic conditions implied in the industrial revolution. 'Le Gouvemement fran9ais', says Boislecomte, winding up his argument, ' peut done, en cas de guerre, compter sur I'appui moral et sur I'appui materiel de I'une de ses allies, sur I'appui moral des deux autres et sur la neutralite du 4*.' The Villdle memoirs contain an account of an important conversa- tion which took place between Montmorency and Alexander on 7 November. Alexander spoke of England with a frankness which seems to have astonished Montmorency, saying he was sure she would do nothing against them, but if her co-operation was desired the powers must show a united front {Memoires, iii. 198). Perhaps also this belief in British neutrality will explain Lord Londonderry's bewilderment at the ineffectiveness of the British opposition (see his memoranda, nos. 2 and 3, Wellington, Suppl. Desp. i. 484-9). Anyway it seems to have persisted up to the close. On 20 November Montmorency wrote, ' Le pl6nipotentiaire anglais . . . n'a cependant pu refuser son approbation a la marche qu'on a suivie et a la reserve dont chacun a fait usage. Nous devons done croire que le Cabinet de Londres ne proclamera pas, dans cette circonstance, sa separation des principes de I'AUiance. II n'y a du moins pas a craindre de protestation de sa part contre ce qui a ^t^ r^olu ici.' And again on the same date to Herman : ' L'Angleterre n'admet pas la chance de la guerre, de maniere qu'elle ne nous a pas promis son secours ; mais elle ne desapprouve rien de ce qui s'est fait ; elle se borne a ne point y prendre part, et nous n'aurons probablement pas de protestation, comme elle en a fait k Laybach. Je crois qu'en resultat elle est un peu embarrass^e d'une conduite qui la s^pare de I'alliance, et qu'elle craindra de signaler cette separation par des actes quelconques ' (Arch. Nat., C. de Verone 721). Bois- lecomte says that Wellington went even further than this : ' Le soir meme de son depart le Prince de Mettemich lui demanda si, a la place des Allies, il eut tenu une
