plan was to make a strong demonstration in the direction of Reuil as a blind for a column under Bergeret and Flourens to operate on the right, while Eudes and Duval, respectively, were to command those on the centre and the left. Unfortunately, these excellent men had never commanded a battalion in the field before, in addition to which the sub-officering, as before said, was hopelessly defective. The elementary requisites of a campaign were neglected; artillery, ambulances, and ammunition-wagons were everywhere else except where they should have been. At about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April, Bergeret's column, 10,000 men strong, but with only eight cannon, reached the bridge at Neuilly. They proceeded quite coolly on their way, under the range of Mont Valérien, every JSTational Guard believing it to be in possession of the Commune, when suddenly shells burst from the great fortress, spreading death and destruction in the ranks of the Federals and severing the column into two halves. Panic, confusion, and cries of "treachery," overwhelmed everything.
I well remember my astonishment at the headlong folly of the Federals' confidence in Mont Valérian being safe, since the English papers had days previously published the information of its occupation by the Versaillese. It seemed incredible that what was known to us over here should have been utterly unknown to those on the spot and most immediately interested. The fact was the leaders did know that Mont Valérian was lost to the Commune, but hoped the troops of the line would refuse to fire, and so kept the fact secret. The memory of how the linesmen had fraternised on the 18th of March, and reports as to the untrustworthiness of the Assembly's soldiers, now reinforced by regiments from Germany, had deceived them. They forgot that for this
