Monarch cannot entertain the least Jealousy against his Subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great Liberties both of Speech and Action. In a Government altogether Republican, such as Holland, where there is no Magistrate so eminent as to give Jealousy to the State, there is also no Danger in intrusting the Magistrates with very large discretionary Powers; and tho' many Advantages result from such Powers, in the Preservation of Peace and Order; yet they lay a considerable Restraint on Mens Actions, and make every private Subject pay a great Respect to the Government. Thus it is evident, that the two Extremes, of absolute Monarchy and of a Republic, approach very near to each other in the most material Circumstances. In the first, the Magistrate has no Jealousy of the People: In the second, the People have no Jealousy of the Magistrate: Which want of Jealousy begets a mutual Confidence and Trust in both Cases, and produces a Species of Liberty in Monarchies, and of arbitrary Power in Republics.
To justify the other Part of the foregoing Proposition, that in every Government theMeans
