mind for its own sake, but as it is relative to other things; nor is a motive true or natural in reference to the human mind merely because it exists, unless we at the same time suppose it to be stronger than all others.
But to return. I conceive, first that volition necessarily implies thought or foresight, that is, that it is not accounted for from mere association. All voluntary action implies a view to consequences, a perception of the analogy between certain actions already given, and the particular action then to be employed, a knowledge of the connection between certain actions and the effects to be produced by them; and lastly, a faculty of combining all these with particular circumstances so as to be able to judge how far they are likely to impede or assist the accomplishment of our purposes; in what manner it may be necessary to vary our exertions according to the nature of the case; whether a greater or less degree of force is required to produce the effect, &c. Without this "discourse of reason," this circumspection and comparison, it seems to be as impossible for the human mind to pursue any regular object as it would be for a man hemmed in on all sides by the walls of houses and blind alleys to see his way clearly before him from one end of London to the other, or to go in a strait line from Westminster to Wapping. One would think it sufficient to state the question in order to shew that mere association, (or the mechanical recurrence of any old impressions in a certain order, which can never exactly correspond with the given circumstances,) would never, without the aid of some other faculty, satisfactorily account for the complexity and subtle windings and perpetual changes in the motives of human action. On the hypothesis here spoken of, I could have no comprehensive idea of things to check any immediate, passing impulse, nor should I be able to make any inference with respect to the consequences of
