AN ARGUMENT
IN DEFENCE OF
THE NATURAL DISINTERESTEDNESS
OF THE
HUMAN MIND.
It is the design of the following Essay to show that the human mind is naturally disinterested, or that it is naturally interested in the welfare of others in the same way, and from the same direct motives, by which we are impelled to the pursuit of our own interest.
The objects in which the mind is interested may be either past or present or future. These last alone can be the objects of rational or voluntary pursuit; for neither the past nor present can be altered for the better or worse by any efforts of the will. It is only from the interest excited in him by future objects that man becomes a moral agent, or is denominated selfish, or the contrary, according to the manner in which he is affected by what relates to his own future interest, or that of others. I propose then to shew that the mind is naturally interested in its own welfare in a peculiar mechanical manner, only as far as relates to its past or present impressions. I have an interest in my own actual feelings or impressions by means of
