merely that some man or other has some feeling towards it. This, and nothing more, is what they prove. But if we once admit that this much is proved, what reason have we left for asserting that it is true, as a matter of fact, that whatever any society or any man has a particular feeling towards, always is right? It may, of course, be true as a matter of fact; but is there any reason for supposing that it is? If the predicate which we mean by the word “right,” and which, therefore, must belong to every action which really is right, is something quite different from a mere relation to anybody’s feelings, why should we suppose that such a relation does, in fact, always go along with it; and that this predicate always belongs, in addition, to every action which has the required relation to somebody’s feelings? If rightness is not the same thing as the having a relation to the feelings of any man or set of men, it would be a curious coincidence, if any such relation were invariably a sign of rightness. What we have proved is that rightness is not the same thing as any such relation; and if that be
