it which asserts that every action which does produce them is right. But the view has sometimes been held, I think, that right and wrong depend entirely upon motives: that is to say, that not only is no action right, unless it be done from a good motive, but also that any action which is done from some one motive or some one of a set of motives is always right, whatever its consequences may be and whatever it may be like in other respects. And this view, of course, will contradict both parts of our principle; since it not only implies that an action, which produces the best possible consequences may be wrong, but also that an action may be right, in spite of failing to produce them.
In favour of both these views it may be urged that in our moral judgments we actually do, and ought to, take account of motives; and indeed that it marks a great advance in morality when men do begin to attach importance to motives and are not guided exclusively in their praise or blame, by the “external” nature of the act done or by its consequences. And all this may be fully admitted. It is quite certain that when a
