wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do—at once involves us in an extremely difficult controversy—the controversy concerning Free Will. There are many people who strenuously deny that any man ever could have done anything other than what he actually did do, or ever can do anything other than what he will do; and there are others who assert the opposite equally strenuously. And whichever view be held is, if combined with the view that right and wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do, liable to contradict our theory very seriously. Those who hold that no man ever could have done anything other than what he did do, are, if they also hold that right and wrong depend upon what we can do, logically bound to hold that no action of ours is ever right and none is ever wrong; and this is a view which is, I think, often actually held, and which, of course, constitutes an extremely serious and fundamental objection to our theory: since our theory implies, on the contrary, that we very often do act wrongly, if never quite rightly. Those, on the other hand, who
