Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/45

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.

Many people might be inclined to admit that, whenever a man acts wrongly, his action always does, on the whole, result in greater unhappiness than would have ensued if he had acted differently; and that when he acts rightly this result never ensues: that, on the contrary, right action always does in the end bring about at least as much happiness, on the whole, as the agent could possibly have brought about by any other action which was in his power. The proposition that wrong action always does, and (considering how the Universe is constituted) always would, in the long-run, lead to less pleasure than the agent could have brought about by acting differently, and that right action never does and never would have this effect, is a proposition which a great many people might be inclined to accept; and this is all which, in its first part, our theory asserts. But many of those who would be inclined to assent to this proposition, would feel great hesitation in going on to assert that this is why actions are right or wrong respectively. There seems to be a very important difference