the sole effect of another were to be the enjoyment of a much more refined one, then they must hold that there would be no reason whatever for preferring the latter to the former, provided only that the mere quantity of pleasure enjoyed in each case were the same. And if the bestial pleasure were ever so slightly more pleasant than the other, then they must say it would be our positive duty to do the action which would bring it about rather than the other. This is a conclusion which does follow from the assertion that actions are right because they produce a maximum of pleasure, and which does not follow from the mere assertion that the producing a maximum of pleasure is always, in fact, a sign of rightness. And it is for this, and similar reasons, that it is important to distinguish the two propositions.
To many persons it may seem clear that it would be our duty to prefer some pleasures to others, even if they did not entail a greater quantity of pleasure; and hence that though actions which produce a maximum of pleasure are perhaps, in fact, always right, they are not right because of this, but only because
