INTRODUCTION
tion of the Law is corrected by the will of the Father. It is not broken, but more truly and perfectly fulfilled.
One is reminded of a passage in Plato's Statesman: "The best of all is not that a law should rule, but a man, if the man be wise and of royal nature. . . . A law can never comprehend exactly what is noblest and most just for all cases, and consequently cannot enjoin what is best. The infinite varieties of men and circumstances, and the fact that nothing human ever for a moment stands still, make it impossible for any art to lay down a simple rule to hold universally and for all time. . . . But that is what we see the law aiming at, like some stubborn and ignorant man who will allow nothing to be done against his orders and no further questions to be asked . . ." (p. 294a).
Equally near to Aeschylus is Aristotle's famous discussion of the difference between legal justice and that higher justice which he calls Epieikeia (Equity). "It is the correction of the law where it fails owing to its generality" (Ethics, v. p. 1137b, 26), and the correction has to be applied by the "wise man." In Aeschylus as in these two philosophers the ultimate justice is to be found in an appeal from a law to a person.
This appeal plays an important rôle in the history of Greek thought, and consequently in that of all modern Europe. The other philosophic schools of the Hellenistic Age, Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean, made even greater use than Plato and Aristotle of the idea of the Wise Man, rather than the Law, as the judge and embodiment of right conduct. In a grosser form the idea invaded practical politics. We find the
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