to be penetrated by any one who chose to give himself that satisfaction. But it was also, in a very different sense, safe and essential to safety for the person of the author. It is a common incident in the development of society that between effectual prohibition and formal permission there intervenes a stage, in which an act legally forbidden and punishable is nevertheless protected by the predominance of favourable opinion, and practicable therefore, so long as adverse opinion is propitiated by a show of deference; when (in simpler terms) you may do the thing, provided only that you make a decent pretence of not doing it. Every one must have observed and be observing examples of this phenomenon; and it is wonderful to see how long the pretence may be used and even imposed, when it has become so thin that only a historical explanation will account for its existence. The whole character of Euripidean drama fits in with the history of the time to show that to this point had come, in the times of Pericles, Cleon, and Alcibiades, the public expression of dissent from that moribund theology upon which the established cults reposed. 'Impiety' was at Athens a legal crime, and there was more than one way of visiting it with penalties practically unlimited except by the discretion of the adjudicating body. As to definition of the offence, Athenian law was throughout, as would be thought by the heirs of Roman jurisprudence, in this respect objectionably lax; and indeed this particular offence does in fact belong to that most important class which, whatever the law may say, will in any society, where 'the masses' have weight, refuse to be limited otherwise than by the circumstances of the case. Libel and slander for instance, among ourselves, notwithstanding disquisition and decision, might still be defined without much practical error to be such offensive speech or writing as a jury will in the circumstances find to be criminal or (as the case may be) will visit with damages. 'Impiety' at Athens stood in the same position, or to speak more properly, hung in the same suspension. There is abundant evidence that the law could be set in motion, and that fine, banishment, even death might be incurred for offences against religion—if a jury could be found so disposed. Once at least as we know[1] Euripides was the object of such proceedings; and it is a fair supposition, in the meagre-
