FBI and DHS acknowledged that the Intelligence Community needs to improve its handling and dissemination of threat information from social media and online message boards.
USCP's intelligence components failed to convey the full scope of threat information they possessed. Although USCP mainly relies on the FBI and DHS for intelligence and threat information, USCP has three components responsible for intelligence-related activities. These components, and the materials they produce, are supposed to inform USCP's security and operational planning. This, however, was not the case for January 6.
USCP's lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division ("IICD")—was aware of the potential for violence in the days and weeks ahead of January 6. It received information from a variety of sources about threats of violence focused on the Joint Session and the Capitol Complex and the large crowds expected to gather in Washington, D.C. on January 6. Yet, IICD failed to fully incorporate this information into all of its internal assessments about January 6 and the Joint Session. As a result, critical information regarding threats of violence was not shared with USCP's own officers and other law enforcement partners.
USCP's preparations for the Joint Session also suffered because of the decentralized nature of its intelligence components. On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP intelligence-related component received information from the FBI's Norfolk Field Office regarding online discussions of violence directed at Congress, including that protestors were coming to Congress "prepared for war." This report, similar to other information received by IICD, was never distributed to IICD or USCP leadership before January 6.
USCP was not adequately prepared to prevent or respond to the January 6 security threats, which contributed to the breach of the Capitol. Steven Sund, the USCP Chief on January 6, and Yogananda Pittman, who was designated as Acting Chief after Steven Sund announced his resignation on January 7, both attributed the breach of the Capitol to intelligence failures across the federal government. USCP leadership, however, also failed to prepare a department-wide operational plan for the Joint Session. Similarly, USCP leadership did not develop a comprehensive staffing plan for the Joint Session detailing, among other things, where officers would be located. USCP could not provide the Committees any documents showing where officers were located at the start of the attack and how that changed throughout the attack.
USCP leadership also failed to provide front-line officers with effective protective equipment or training. Although USCP activated seven specialty Civil Disturbance Unit ("CDU") platoons in advance of the Joint Session, only four of those platoons were outfitted with special protective equipment, including helmets, hardened plastic armor, and shields. The many other USCP officers who fought to defend the Capitol were left to do so in their daily uniforms. Many of those front-line officers had not received training in basic civil disturbance tactics since their initial Recruit Officer Class training. While some CDU officers were issued special protective equipment, the platoons were not authorized to wear the equipment at the beginning of their shifts. Instead, USCP staged equipment on buses near the Capitol. In at least one instance, when the platoon attempted to retrieve the equipment, the bus was locked, leaving the platoon without access to this critical equipment. USCP also failed to provide equipment
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