there as the armed ally of another Power, as we were on the verge of doing last autumn." The National Service League denied that, in advocating such a policy, there was any intention of aggression, but there is little doubt as to the construction which Germans would place on such remarks from one occupying so prominent a place in English public life. At the best, the assertion that British conscription would have prevented the war is "not proven;" at the worst, it would be possible to argue that, if at any time a British Cabinet with aggressive designs came into power, conscription would furnish the means for action.
The Universal Service League has urged "the adoption for the period of the present war of the principle of universal compulsory war service, whether abroad or at home." The reasons usually given are the need for preserving Great Britain and Australia from alien rule.
Leaving for the moment the question of the period during which conscription would be in force, let us examine these reasons. Some conscriptionists admit the extreme difficulty of seizing and holding England. It would, indeed, be a hopeless undertaking. Germany has had forty years' experience of attempting to Teutonise and subdue Alsace-Lorraine, with, to say the least of it, very unsatisfactory results. Is it likely that the German Government would try the same experiment with forty millions of people accustomed to freedom? But those who picture Germany taking Great Britain frequently state that she will begin by making sure of the coast opposite—Belgium, Holland, Northern France, perhaps Denmark. This trifling programme being accomplished, then ho! for the British Isles and the Over-Seas Dominions.
This brings us to the second reason. The armies and fleets of the Allies have all been swept aside, to the last submarine and the last soldier. Germany's fleet has in some marvellous manner survived the catastrophes that disposed of the Allies fleets; from her present disorganised and scattered mercantile marine, and with the aid of commandeered vessels and coerced British and foreign sailors, she has equipped a fleet of perhaps 500 ships to carry, say, half a million men, with horses, guns, stores and ammunition for the invasion and occupation of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa; for doubtless similar fears are being expressed in each of the Dominions. It took England, with the sea clear and her huge mercantile marine to assist, about three months to land a quarter of a million men in South Africa at the time of the Boer War. If Germany attempted the conquest and subduing of Australia only, the undertaking would be enormously difficult, even if Great Britain's other Dominions, together with France, Italy and Russia, merely looked on. The journey to Australia is very much longer than that to South Africa, and the task of keeping up supplies would be enormous.
The obstacles assumed as removed in the last two paragraphs place the proposition of a successful occupation of Australia, or, indeed, of Great Britain, out of court. But there are other very serious difficulties. The re-adjustment of German finance will require wise statesmanship and unremitting effort over a long period. But perhaps the greatest obstacle of all is the German people themselves; they have fought this war energetically because
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