tion serves as a caution to the engineman; whereas, when the telegrapher is not there, the engineman is in danger of failing to note the signal. In other words, the Commission finds the telegrapher left to himself is unreliable, and the same conclusion is arrived at in regard to the engineman and the automatic signals. According to the report, to obtain the desired security the best-known method is to rely upon the coöperation of these three acknowledged insecurities.
But apart from this consideration, the point for us railroad men to note is that we have been found directly and personally responsible for the accidents. Our failure in duty has been the actual cause for the loss of life resulting from these collisions. To say the least, these failures in duty are very numerous, and the authorities who are depended upon to look into these matters are of opinion that “the block-signal system is the best-known instrumentality for the prevention of” these accidents. But, unfortunately, a great many years must elapse before the railroads, both single and double track, can be thoroughly equipped with these signals, and meanwhile the public must remain at the mercy of these failures in duty which in the main, some day, block signals are expected to eliminate.
Working along these lines, however, the progress
