STATE V. MEBRITT. 283 �isBory note be made payable on demand, evidence that it was payable at some other time, or upon a contingency, ia inad- missible. 2 Par. on Bills, 50e; 1 Dan. on Negotiable Instru- ments, § 80; Free v. Hawkins, 8 Taunt. 92; Woodbridge v. Spooner, 3 B. & Aid, 283. �These authorities seem to demonstrate that, if Eonald had 6een fit the next day to file a bill to foreclose this mortgage, Groves could not have shown in defence a paroi agreement that no action should be taken upon it until his stock had been sold. If euch be the case, then it clearly did not oper- ate to extend the time for the payment of Mayes' debt. Again, in order to release the sureties the extension must be for a definite time. Brandt on Guaranty, § — . �I think it extremely doubtful whether, upon Grove's own statement, the time for payment was fixed with sufficient certainty. It depended upon a contingency which might happen -within a week, and might be postponed for months. �I think the complainant is entitled to a decree. ���The State of Missouri, etc., v. Mereitt and others. �(Circuit Omrt, E. D. Missouri. March 17, 1880.) �Rbmoval of Cause — Act March 3, 1875 — Tbrm Prior and Triai, Subsequent to Passage op Act. — The right to remove a cause from a State court, under the act of March 3, 1875, is lost where such cauae was tried in a term which began before, but at a date which was subse- quent to, the passage of that act. �Motion to remand the cause to the state court. �Cane, Jamison e Day, for plaintiff. �George P. Strong, for defendants. �McCeakt, J. This cause is brought here by removal from the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, and the motion now before us is to remand it to that court, for the reason that the petition for removal was not filed within the time pre- Bcribed by the act of congress of March 8, 1875. �The third section of that act requires that the petition for ��� �
