NOETON V. AMERICAN EING 00. 687 �BÏsted that, inasmuch as the evidence did not sliow plaintiff to have been the proximate cause of eaeh particular sale made by the defendant to purchasers originally introduced by plain- tiff, it was erroneous to permit the jury to consider sales made by defendant after plaintiff had ceased to solicit orders, as a basis for the estimate of damages. �The jury were instructed that plaintiff was entitled to com- missions on ail the trade made by him for the defendant within the two years, and that trade made by him included ail the sales made by the defendant of which the plaintiff was the inducing cause. This, of course, permitted the jury to find that he was entitled to commissions on many sales made by the defendant, in regard to which the plaintiff's interven- tion consisted solely in originally introducing the purchaser to the defendant. Undoubtedly, if the agreement had been for commissions upon ail goods sold by the plaintiff, this would not have authorized commissions where the particular sale was not made in consequence of the plaintiff's services. But the stipulation to pay commissions not only upon ail goods sold by him, but also upon ail trade made, could have been made with no other intent than to secure plaintiff com- missions, whether the particular sale was made by him or not, whenever it was due to his influence and the defendant de- rived the benefit of it. I am satisfied that there were no errors on the trial, and that the verdict of the jury, though perhaps more liberal to the plaintiff than was to be espected, cannot be considered as agaiust the «vidence. �Motion for new trial denied. ��� �
