BATES V. UNITED STATES. 95 �sent by the mail to him under that name, and such communications were aceordiugly so received. They were, therefore, communications sent to a real person under a fictitious name, and of course it was as mucb an ofience against this statute for the plaintifif in error to cause non-mailable matter to be deposited for mailing as though there had been ^o fiction in the case. �It is also objected that the district court erred in admitting testi- mony relating to an article transmitted by express. That testimony was.admitted on the assumption that it was sent by the plaintiff in error in answer to a letter addressed to him, and simply for the pur- pose of explaining the facts connected with the ofifences charged in the indictment, and not constituting an oSence in itself, which, of couise, it was not, under this statute. This testimony was received, under proper caution to the jury, with a statement explanatory of the reason why and for what it was a,dmitted, and I think could not have prej- udiced the jury against the defendant. �It was algo objected that the district court refused to allow the defendant to prove that certain pills which were sent by mail would not, of themaelves, prevent conception or procure abortion. I think the ruling of the district court was correct upon that point. The lan- guage of the statute is not that the article must necessarily procure abortion or prevent conception, but that it is designed or intended to procure the one or to prevent the other; and these pills were sent in answer to a letter asking for something which might have that effect, and they were sent with the statement that they were just what the writer wanted. �Itisfurther objected that the deposit of thebook, letters, circulars, etc., in the mail was not donc by the plaintiii in error himself, but by another person. The language of the statute shows clearly that it was intended to prevent any one from violating the law by another as well as by himself, and the jury were specially instructed by the district court that they must be satisfied that the act done was authorized by the plaintiff in error; in other words, that he caused it to be done through another. �The district court was requested by the plaintiff in error to give numerouB instructions which in terms were refused by the court, but the court instructed the jury generally upon the law of the case, and so far as there was anything material in the instructions asked for in favor of the plaintiff in error which the law justified the court in giv- ing.they were given by the court, and I cannot see that there was any error in this respect. On the whole, I am of opinion that the judgment ��� �
