3H FEDERAL MIPORTEK. �against him; so that although the bill does not ask for any special relief as againat Harvey, still Ilarvey lias necessarily to be a party to the deoree which might be rendered in the case, and by which he wouM always be bound ; aud it wohM seem to follow that, becaiise he -would be bound by such a decree, he is not a mere nominal party to this litigation. �The language of the last clause of the second section of the act of 18Y5is: , , �"And when in any suit mentioned in this section there sliall be a contro- versy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and wUich can be fully determined as between them, then eitlier one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants aetually interested in such controversy may remove said suit to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district." �Now, it can hardly be said that, in this case, under the allegations of the bill, and with Harvey as a. defendant in the suit on answer filed in the state court before it was sought to be removed, that there is. in this case a controversy which is wholly between citizens of dif- ferent states, and which can be fully determined as between them. �In the case of Ribon v. Railroad Co. 16 Wall. 446, the railroad Company had executed several deeds of trust upon its property, mak- ing varions persons trustees. An arrangement was made by the railroad company with another railroad company by which a bill was filed by some of the trustees against other trustees and the grantor railroad company, to foreclose the deeds of trust, so that the other railroad company might become the purchaser of the property for a certain price, and be reorganized. Some of the bondholders and stockholders of the company that executed these deeds of trust were not parties to and were dissatisfied with the agreement that had been made between the two companies, and filed a bill to set aside the decree in the foreclosure proceeding, on the ground that it was eollus- ive. The two railroad companies were made parties to this bill, but not any of the trustees or stockholders of the grantor railroad . The supreme court of the United States held that it was necessary that the trustees should be made parties, and afBrmed a decree dismissing the bill beeause they were not. It was admiti)ed that the foreclosure pro- ceedhigs and decree and sale were regular and valid on their face, and as the trustees were all parties to the decree there would seem to be no doubt that the legal title passed to the purchaser under the decree of foreclosure; but the ground upon which the supreme court held that the trustees were indispensable parties was that if the sale should be annulled they might be called upon and required to refund in the ��� �
