363 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Section 20 of chapter 83, Eev. St. 111., tit. "Limitations," reads as follows : �" When a cause of action has arisen in a state or terrltory out of this state, or in a f oreign country, and by the laws thereof an action cannot be main- tained by reason of the lapae of time, an action theieon shall not be main- tained in this state." �This section was first introduced into the limitation laws of this state in the act of April 4, 1872. Before that time the legislature had somewhat approached the principle embodied in this section by enacting in the act of April 13, 1849, that all actions founded on any promissory note executed, entered into, or acorued beyond the limits of this state, should be commenoed within five years next after such cause of action should have aecrued. And by the act of February 19, 1859, the words "cause of action aecrued" were delined to mean ] the time when an action might have been commenced, " whether in this state or elsewhere." But, saving this exceptional legislation, the rule laid down in Chenot v. Lefevre, 3 Gil. 637, that the bar of the statute can arise only by a continuons residence within this state from the time the right of action aecrued until the bar of the statute is complete, had been the settled law of this state up to the act of April 4, 1872 ; but by the section now under consideration the legislature evidently intended that when a debt had become barred by the operation of the laws of another state or country, the debtor, if sued in this state, could successfully plead such bar. �The plaintiff, however, insists that this case does not corne within the seope of the twentieth section because the cause of action aecrued upon the note in this state ; that the defendant resided in this state when the note fell due, and the statute of this state had commenced to run; that the bar had not become complete when defendant re- moved to Missouri, and therefore the case comes within the opera- tion of the last clause of the eighteenth section of chapter 83, which provides that "if after a cause of action accrues the debtor departs from and resides out of this state, the time of bis absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." And plain- tiff argues that as the defendant was once within the jurisdiction of this state, and the statute of this state began to run here, the defend- ant cannot by a removal to another state, where the time for barring the action is shorter than here, avail himself of the statute of such state as a defence here. �But it seems to me the two sections referrod to must now be read ��� �
