CITIZENS' INS. CO. V. KOtNIZ LINB. 7T8 �tickets were given/all headed "Vanderbilt line," and signed by D. B. Allen, agent, who was the comtnon agent. The proof also showed that there was no joint interest in the passage money, and no agree- ment for its division, The court held that there was no joint agency. Judge Strong says, (19 Barb. 238 :) "They [the defendants, the several lines,] had, it is true, the same agent, but he acted in his vicarious capacity separately for each." Judge Parker (21 Barb. 30,) says: "Allen sold the plaintiflf three tickets, and sold each as the agent of the owner of one part of the line." �I confess I have found great difficulty in solving the question so as to make a decision which should be in harmony, on the one hand, with the rule as laid down by Chief Justice Tindal in Fox v. Glifton, 6 Bing. 240, as to the doctrine of liability springing from holding out one's self as partner, as contradistinguished from the actual relation- ship of partnership, and the long line of cases in which that rule has been followed ; and, on the other hand, with the well-eonsidered cases in which the doctrine of holding out as having the relation of partner is applied to connected lines of carriers. It is clear that the latter cases have modified the general doctrine of implication in its applica- tion to connected lines. This is in consequence of the impossibility of conducting the ramified business of transporting our vast com- merce over our continent without permitting the announcemeut of connections in routes which must be understood to be mei*e conj mic- tions as to time and place, and not the assumption or distribution of liability. Taking the doctrine of implied liability as it has been announced by the courts whose adjudications should be held the most binding, in its application to carriers who have combined in the formation of continuons routes, I feel sure the bills of lading Bued on in this case created an obligation on the part of the owners of the Yeager alone, and that the libellants have failed to establish any joint contract, or any such holding out as would bind the cor- porations who are the defendants. Without deciding any of the other questions presented in the cause, I am of opinion, therefore, that the libel must be dismissed. ��� �
