C8 ���PKDERAIJ EEfOiiTEU. ���of a court of equity to allow interest in a proper case. In Hunn v. Norton, 1 Hopk. Gh. 392, it was ruled that interest should be allowed from the date of the report. In Turiier v. Burkinshaw, L. R. 2 Ch. 488, it was allowed from the date of the report, and the principles are stated which change the rule in cases of fraud and concealment, as in Hardwicke v. Vemon, 14 Vas. 504. In Blogg v. Johnson, L. K. �2 Ch. 225, it is said a mere omission to account does not invoke this rule, and interest was charged only from the date of the report. In Gallivan v. Evans, 1 Bail. & B. 191, an administrator pendente lite was not charged with interest pending the suit, although he had the fund in hand. In Dawson v. Massy, Id. 230, it was laid down as the rule, in cases where he was chargeable with interest, that it should com- mence from the time when the exeeutor could show no cause for retaining a balance in his hands. In People v. New York, etc., 5 Cow. 331, and Sivett v. Flooper, 62 Me. 54, it is said that wherever a debtor knows what he is to pay, and when he is to pay it, he shall be charged with interest if he neglects to pay; and no demand is neces- sary. And in Pope v. Barrett, 1 Mason, 117, the rule is stated that interest is generally due from suits brought in cases where it is nec- essary to make demand before putting the parfcy in default for non- payment. Williams v. Baxter, 3 McL. 471; Hunt v. Nevers, 15 Pick. 500 ; Rishton v. Grissell, L. E. 10 Eq. 393. In Gratton v. Appleton, �3 Story, 755, an agent was not charged with interest pending the suit where he made none, and was entitled to the judgment of the court whether he should pay. And so it was in Wade v. Wade's Adm'r, 1 Wash, 475, where interest was waived on that account ; and in Nor- man V. Storer, 1 Blatchf. 593, the exeeutor was charged only from the date of the deposit. Stearns v. Brown, 1 Pick. 530, seems to hold that an exeeutor is liable for interest after proceedings commenced only when he makes it. But in Flintham's Appeal, 11 S. & H. 16, he was charged from the time of filing his reports in the court below, where he admitted a balance; while in Hoopes v. Brinton, 8 Watts, 73, it was held he was liable only from date of confirmation, and should not be chargeable pending exceptions to the report. In Laura Jane V. Hagan, 10 Humph. 331 ; Sparhawk v. Buell, 9 Vt. 41, 81 ; Brinkley V. Willis, 22 Ark. 1; Scrivener v. Scrivener, 1 H. & J. (Md.) 743, (which I have not seen,) interest was allowed from the filing of the bill. Pickering v. Stamford, 4 Bro. G. G. 160, note e; S. G. 2 Ves., 581, 586. �The rule to be gathered from the cases, I think, is this : Where an exeeutor is, upon principle, Liable for interest, he will be charged ��� �
