Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/493

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486 FEDERAL REPORTER. �not purport a future warrant, because, if the attention of tha assured had been called to them as continuing oovenants, they might bave been qualifled. Thus, in the important ease of Eipley v. JStna Ins. Co. 30 N. Y. 136, which is in accordance with the wcight of authority, if the assured had been asked whether he agreed to have a watchman every night, he would probably have excepted Saturdays ; but, be- ing asked, generally, whether a watchman was employed at night, he said "Yes." Tbere are other objections to oonstru- ing similar words in the same paper as representations of the present or covenant for the future upon an arbitrary stand- . ard of the importance of the particular subject. In ail these cases, on either aide, there was no written statement upon the Bubject-matter of the supposed warranty. Here, then, was an oral statement that a watchman was at the mill "day and night," and there was an oral description of the force- pump. These statements were tfue at that time, and trua at each renewal of the policy, and therefore it is of no con- sequence whether they are called warranties or representa- tions. �I have seen no case which holds that an oral statement of a factcouldbe construed into a continuing warranty or prom- ise when the contract is in writing. Clark v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co. 2 Woodb. & M. 472; 5 How. 235, merely decide that paroi evidence might be introduced to identify the written application referred to in a policy. That covenants cannot be imported into or taken out of a written contract by paroi, is an elementary rule, applicable to contracta for insurance as to others. See Abbott v. Shatvmut Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 3 Allen, 213 ; Schmidt \. Peoria Mut. Ins. Co. 41 111. 295; Hig- ginsony. Dali, 13 M&sB.QG; Kimbally.jEtna Ins. Co. 9 Allen, 540. The judgment in the case last cited reviews the author- ities, and decides that an actual promise, if oral, cannot be given in evidence todefeat a policy which has once attached. Ilere there is no contention that an oral promise was made, but only that the court ought to infer one from the oral state- ment of a fact. �In respect to increase of risk I understand the law to ba ����