IN BE TOWNSEND. 563 �that in this case, on the facts as conceded, the bankrupts ara entitled to their discharge." �Judge Blatchford bas, In re Sheldon, expressed an opinion on this BTibject, but it was ohiter dictum, as the proceedings -vere ail commenced before the twenty-second of June, 1874, and consequently were not governed by that law. Judge Gresham, U. S. district judge for Indiana, has taken the same view of the case as Judge Blatchford. �On the weight of the authorities (as far as I can inform myself) I shall follow Judge Drummond's opinion, and con- clude that the act of June 22, 1874, altogether repealed the provisional clause of 5112 in both of the Eevised Statutes, and that, as a necessary resuit, if there had (in this case) been any assets to entitle the bankrupt to a discharge, there must have been 30 per cent, of the claims proven against his estate upon which he is liable as a principal debtox, without regard to the time they originated ; and if, as in the present case, there are no assets, then it is requisite to have the assent of one-third in value and one-fourth in number of his creditors to assent to his discharge, no matter when the claims of these creditors arose. By this repeal the creditors whose debts were oontraeted before the first day of January, 1869, whether they bave proven their claims or not, are "entitled" to the same status, as to giving or withholding their assent to a discharge of the bankrupt, as ail the other creditors. �As the law now stands, after the repeal of the provision afore- said, the bankrupt has to have 30 per cent, of the proven claims only, and, therefore, creditors who have not proven their claims cannot add them to swell the aggregate of the bank- rupt' s liabUity, but they are, in general terms, without any words of restriction as contained in the repealing act, let in to give or withhold their assent to the bankrupt's discharge where there are no, or not sufficient, assets. The exact words, showing no restriction in the repealing act, are as foUows: "Without the assent ofat least one-fourth of his creditors in number, and one-third in value." Thus it will be seen that upon this construction of the law the bankrupt has not the requisite amount in value of creditors assenting to his dis- ����
