similar, and the fire happened in that case from an explosion, producing a fire at a distant point from the site of the insured property. A wind prevailed at the time, and swept the fire a considerable distance, and the property insured, and covered by the policy, was destroyed by fire. The company was sued, and it defended on the ground that the case was covered by the exception, which was that the company should not be liable for a fire produced by an explosion. That policy was at the opposite pole from the one here under consideration, and the assured was defeated. He recovered nothing. No doubt he thought that very unreasonable, as it seems to me most persons would regard it. He intended, no doubt, to have his property protected by that policy, and supposed it was protected. The supreme court of the United States held from principle that it was not.
It is very possible that the conditions of this clause (which were frequently brought to my attention, for I had a great deal to do with this head of the law, practically) had produced a good deal of dissatisfaction, and hence this clause was changed. If that policy had been the same in this particular as those under discussion here, then, irrespective of the question of explosion, the party would have been entitled to recover; but, the policy being different, the result was different. A change was made, probably having its origin in that case and others like it—a change was made to meet that difficulty, and hence it is, perhaps, we have these policies phrased as they are before us.
Now, to recur again to the proposition to which I adverted at the outset, to-wit, that there is nothing here which in terms withdraws the protection against fire, although that fire should involve an explosion. It seems to me that there would have been language to that effect, if such had been the intention of the parties. The intention of the statute constitutes the law; the intention of the law-makers constitutes the law; the language may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and the language may be within its meaning and not within its letter. That is a familiar proposition. If we can ascertain the intention and meaning of the
