METCALF V. OFFICBB. 641 �Motion for new trial. ' �C. C. Cale, for motion. �Mr. Cummings, contra. �Nelson, D. J. 1. The first issue for the jury to determine — "Is Mrs. M. E. Mead a secret or dormant partner of the firm of A. Bernard & Ce?" — was fairly and properly sub- mitted. I have reviewed the charge to the jury, and the tes- timony upon that issue, and find no error. While it is true that general reputation is not admissible, in aid of other tes- timony, to -prove a partnership, yet, when the issue is of the character presented here, and the inquiry is whether a mem- her of a partnership is a dormant partner, such general evi- dence is admissible. �The definition of a dormant partner sanctions such proof. He is one ■whose name and transactions are unknown to the world, at least to such extent that he cannot be regarded an ostensible partner. It is a question of fact for the jury to determine, although the style of the partnership indicated to the -world that more than one might be members of the copartnership ; and the sarae class of testimony whieh would justify a jury in deciding ■whether a plaintiff knew a defend- ant -was a partner, is competent and admissible to determine whether a partner is dormant. �The evidence of general knowledge in the community was introduced for the purpose of showing the relation of Mrs. M. E, Mead to the partnership; that instead of being an active and ostensible partner she was a dormant and secret one. �The counsel for the ctefendants urge that, the style of the firm being A. Bernard & Co., Mrs. M. E. Mead could not in law be a dormant parter. This is the substance of the claim, although with this qualification : "In a partnership between two persons only, under the style of A. Bernard & Co., one of them cannot, in law, be a dormant partner." I agree with counsel that the legal presumption is that both members of a partnership, composed of two persons under such style, are to be deemed ostensible partners ; yet the right to �v.2,no.7— 41 ����
