BMITH r. MOBGANSTEEN. 675 �objects of the bankrupt law; and it provides two methods of effectuating these objects. In one, the assets are admin- istered and ratably distributed by an assignee, selected by the creditors, and the bankrupt is discharged only by the special order of the court ; in the other, the bankrupt and his creditors deal directly with each other, by compounding the debts at a fixed rate, which composition, when approved by the court and carried into effect, operates as a discharge of the bankrupt, without any formai order by the court. But as alternative and equally available means of accomplishing the same general results, they are constituent parts of the System of bankruptcy, and are alike with in the scope and designation of bankruptcy proceedings. �The contested exception is founded upon the twenty- ninth section of the bankrupt act, which enaets that "if the bankrupt, or any person in his behalf, bas procured the as sent of any crediter at any stage of the proceedings, by any pecuniary consideration or obligation, his discharge shaU not be granted." �It alleges in substance that the bankrupts influenced the action of certain of their creditors by a pecuniary considera- tion, at that stage of the proceedings, when they made a proposition of composition. It is thus clearly within the terms of the section. Why, then, is it not sufficient in point of law to prevent the discharge of the bankrupts ? Two argu- ments are urged against this conclusion : �1. That the original bankrupt act contained no provision for composition, and that, therefore, the twenty-ninth section of the act is inapplicable to any act of the bankrupts touch- ing a composition. While the several sections of the bank- rupt law, as it now stands, were enacted at different times, that can make no difference in its construction as a whole. The sections of the act relating to composition were engrafted upon it as amendments, and hence are to be taken as parts of it, with like effect as if they had been incorporated with it in its original enactment. If, then, the terms are sufficiently general to embrace an act done to obtain a benefit provided by the amendments, the statute cannot be treated as inap- ����
