276 FEDERAL REPORTER. �the apparent spirit or general purpose of a statute. It must be certain and explicit, and if there is any well-founded doubt, arising out of the ambiguity or obscurity of the language of the statute, as to whether the legislature intended an exemp- tion or not, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the state. But this axiom does not call for a strained construction, ad- verse to the legislative intention. On the contrary, it is the duty of the court to ascertain as best it can, in accordance with the established canons of construction, the real intention of the act to be construed, and when a conclusion is reaohed to enforce the legislative will as it may be statutorily declared. Where the language is clear and explicit the court is bound, ■without considering consequences, to give it effect. It naust be construed as a whole. The of&ce of a good expositor, says My Lord Coke, "is to make construction on ail its parts together." The plainest words may be controlled by the con- text. It is the intention expressed in the act, as a •whole, that is to prevail. Courts look to the context, as well as to the words, for the meaning of particular words used ia the act. They may also take into consideration the purposes the legis- lature was endeavoring to accomplish, acts in pari materia, and contemporaneous surroundings. These rules of common eense, applied from time to- time in the construction of stat- utes, shaU guide us in thîa instance. �The constitution commands, and, as far as was practicable, guaranties, impartiality of legislation, and this policy seems to bave been adopted by the legislature, and applied to ail railroad companies,as far as the circumstancesof the several cases would permit. The exemption from taxation of the capital stock absolutely, and of the roads, fixtures, ap- purtenances, and vehicles of transportation for 20 years, seems to bave been the general rule. Clauses providing for these exemptions were incorporated in the earlier charters. But in later acts the legislature, instead of inserting in each act of incorporation ail the powers and immunities intended to be granted, was content to refer to some previous char- ter, and give to the new company "ail the rights, powers, and privileges" of the old. It is, we think, clear that the legisla- ����
